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Réamhrá ón Aire 
 
Gach bliain, foilsíonn an Phríomh-Oifig Staidrimh sonraí ón Suirbhé ar Dhálaí 
Ioncaim agus Maireachtála, ar suirbhé bliantúil é a chuireann eolas tábhachtach ar 
fáil faoi leibhéil bhochtaineachta agus díothachta in Éirinn.  Cuireann sé ar ár 
gcumas monatóireacht a dhéanamh ar dhul chun cinn maidir leis na leibhéil sin a 
laghdú agus measúnú a dhéanamh ar cibé acu an bhfuil fíorathrú á bhaint amach 
againn ar mhaithe le daoine atá beo bocht agus/nó daoine a dtéann díothacht agus 
eisiamh sóisialta i bhfeidhm orthu. 
 
Téann an tuarascáil seo níos faide ach díriú isteach ar thrí chineál tacaíochtaí, is iad 
sin tithíocht, cúram leanaí agus seirbhísí cúraim phríomhúil, agus scrúdú a 
dhéanamh ar an tionchar a bhíonn acu ar dhíothacht in Éirinn.  Déanann sé scrúdú 
ar cibé acu an bhfaigheann siad siúd is mó a dteastaíonn na tacaíochtaí sin uathu na 
tacaíochtaí sin. Ní hamháin go mbreathnaítear ar ghrúpaí de réir aicme shóisialta 
ach breathnaítear ar ghrúpaí riosca shóisialta freisin. 
 
Tráth a bhfuil dúshláin shuntasach shóisialta agus eacnamaíochta roimh Éirinn mar 
gheall ar an bpaindéim Covid-19 agus na srianta lena mbaineann, cuireann an 
taighde seo léargas úsáideach ar fáil ar thionchar na dtacaíochtaí sin, ní hamháin 
astu féin ach i dteannta a chéile freisin.  Cuireann sé go mór leis an taighde atá ann 
faoin ábhar sin agus tacóidh sé le heolas a dhéanamh don Treochlár um an 
Ionchuimsiú Sóisialta 2020-2025 a chur i bhfeidhm, arb é sin an straitéis náisiúnta 
maidir le laghdú bochtaineachta agus cuimsiú sóisialta feabhsaithe in Éirinn. 
 
Ba mhaith liom buíochas a ghabháil leis an bhfoireann taighde san Institiúid Taighde 
Eacnamaíochta agus Sóisialta as an anailís mhionsonraithe mhachnamhach a rinne 
siad agus an staidéar sin á chur le chéile acu: Bertrand Maître, Ivan Privalko agus  
Dorothy Watson. Ba mhaith liom freisin aitheantas a thabhairt don obair a rinne an 
Rannóg um Chuimsiú Sóisialta sa Roinn Coimirce Sóisialaí, a bhainistigh an staidéar 
go dtí an foilseachán. 
 
 
Joe O’Brien, T.D. 





This report explores the association between three specific types of social 
transfer, and deprivation – the inability to afford basic goods and services. 
We are interested in both cash and non-cash transfers that are tied to 
specific areas of need; these are housing, childcare, and medical care. The 
study has three aims. First, we explore the coverage of these social 
transfers, asking if those who need transfers are most likely to receive them. 
Second, we consider the difference in deprivation between recipients and 
non-recipients. Third, we explore rates of deprivation among recipients 
before and after accounting for transfers, and whether this association is 
different for social risk and social class groups. Our main research question 
asks: what is the association between transfers and deprivation for social 
risk and social class groups? While other authors typically focus on the 
relationship between transfers and income poverty, which is defined using a 
monetary value, we consider a broader outcome, namely the household’s 
ability to achieve a basic standard of living. 
 
When measuring the association between transfers and deprivation, we 
assign a monetary value for non-cash transfers (‘in-kind’ transfers) like 
medical cards and childcare services. We do not need to do this for tied cash 
transfers like Rent Supplement, or more specific transfers with obvious cash 
values, like Housing Benefits (which contain a package of services like the 
free TV-licence scheme). However, where transfers are in-kind, we first 
estimate their possible cash value. We use several sources to estimate their 
worth, including data from the Primary Care Reimbursement Service and 
ESRI’s SWITCH model (Simulating Welfare Income Tax Childcare and 
Health). Specifically, we estimate the effects of childcare supports and 
childcare schemes, which provide crucial resources to young families, 
especially unemployed families. We also assign a monetary value to medical 
and GP cards, which do not take the form of a cash transfer but provide an 
important resource to families.  
 
Governments intervene to limit poverty and deprivation but must increasingly 
achieve ‘more with less’. An important consideration is whether those who 
 
Page 18 
receive the transfers are the neediest and whether the transfers improve 
their lives. Despite their importance, there is little research on the link 
between transfers and deprivation.  
 
Key findings: Housing transfers 
The Irish housing market experienced substantial change in the last twenty 
years, with home ownership rates declining and rates of private rented 
accommodation rising. Despite the decline in home ownership rates, the 
supply of social housing has not increased, resulting in an increasing 
reliance on the private rental sector for the provision of accommodation to 
families and individuals. This was accompanied by a change in housing 
transfers. 
 
We find that the housing transfers that we consider in our report have 
declined in recent years, although we note that more recent programmes, 
such as Housing Assistance Payments (HAP), have increased. Our data, 
which refers to 2017, does not consider this scheme.1 However, even before 
the introduction of HAP payments (which were launched in 2014 and 
became nationally available in 2017), the total cost and the number of those 
receiving housing transfers which we consider in our report has been in 
decline (Figure 2.4 and Figure 2.5). Part of this effect may be explained by 
the economic recovery that took place during that time. Importantly, we note 
that the average housing transfer has increased in value since 2012, which 
likely reflects the rising cost of housing, but may also reflect a difference in 
the composition of households seeking the payment. 
 
Using data from the Survey on Income and Living Conditions, we find that a 
substantial portion of the population receive housing transfers of some kind 
(roughly 44 per cent). However, most of these respondents receive Housing 
Benefits, which are transfers designed to help with heating, electricity, and 
 
                                                             
 
1 The survey was conducted in 2017 but the income reference period is the 12 months prior to the date of the 




other minor costs. A far smaller portion of the population, (roughly three per 
cent), receive Housing Supplements,2 which are designed to help cover 
the costs of rent or mortgage interest payments (Figure 2.7). There are 
sharp differences in the value of housing benefits and housing supplements, 
with supplements being higher on average but less common (Figure 2.8). A 
small portion of respondents (1.3 per cent) receive both a Housing 
Supplement and a Housing Benefit; the value of their transfers is typically 
higher than the other groups. 
 
We find that respondents over the age of 65 had the greatest access to 
Housing Transfers (Housing Supplements or Housing Benefits3). 
Although we are not able to split housing transfer types by social risk and 
social class groups due to small numbers, we find that housing transfers 
more broadly were more common among older respondents. This finding 
likely reflects the transfers and benefits that are tied to retirement. Working 
age adults (“Other adults” in the figures) were the least likely to receive 
housing transfers (Figure 2.9). Among those receiving transfers, however, 
we note large differences in their value. The mean value of transfers was 
highest for lone parents and those with a disability, possibly reflecting their 
greater likelihood of receiving Housing Supplement instead of Housing 
Benefits. 
 
Regarding social class, a clearer picture emerges. The unemployed or 
“never worked” social class and lower social class groups were the most 
likely to receive transfers when compared to the other groups (Figure 2.11). 
The value of transfers was also highest for these groups when compared to 
middle and higher social class groups (Figure 2.12). We suspect this is due 
to such groups qualifying for wider benefits, such as Rent Supplement.4 
However, due to data limitations we cannot explore this directly. Finally, we 
find that deprivation is higher among those receiving housing transfers, even 
 
                                                             
 
2 The Mortgage Interest Supplement scheme has been discontinued but existed when data was collected. This 
scheme is discussed in Chapter 2. 
3 Due to CSO limitations we cannot distinguish between housing benefits and housing supplements by social 
risk groups, although a minority of the sample receive housing supplements. 
4 This is partly due to the eligibility requirements for rent supplement. 
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within social risk (Figure 2.13) and social class groups (Figure 2.14). This 
suggests that those experiencing deprivation are the most likely to receive 
housing transfers.  
 
Finally, we use a simulation technique to estimate the association between 
transfers and deprivation. We find that housing transfers have a positive 
effect, in that they are associated with a decreased predicted probability of 
deprivation (Figure 2.16). More importantly, we find that the impact of 
housing transfers is greatest for lone parents and adults with a disability in 
terms of social risk (Figure 2.18) and unemployed and lower occupational 
groups in terms of social class (Figure 2.20). In both instances, vulnerable 
groups are most likely to benefit from housing transfers. Specifically, our 
simulation shows that lone parents saw an almost six percentage point 
decrease in their chance of deprivation after the value of transfers were 
considered, where working age adults (“Other adults” in the graph) saw a 
less than one percentage point decrease after the same transfers were 
considered. Further, those in the unemployed or “never worked” social class 
saw an almost six percentage point decline in their deprivation rate after the 
value of transfers were considered, while those in the highest social class 
group saw a less than one percentage point decrease after the same 
transfers were considered. 
 
Key findings: Medical care 
Regarding Ireland’s health-related transfers, we focus on two specific 
schemes, medical cards and GP visit cards. The former covers the cost of 
GP visits and prescribed medications, while the latter covers GP visits only. 
The latter was recently expanded to include children under the age of six 
and people over the age of 70. For other groups, the distribution of medical 
cards did not change much over the period studied (Figure 3.1). We find that 
vulnerable social risk groups are particularly likely to receive a medical card 
(Figure 3.8), when compared to working age adults (“Other adults” in the 
figures), the majority of whom do not receive either a medical card or a GP 
visit card. Focusing on children under the age of 16, the pattern becomes 
even stronger, with the majority of those in vulnerable social risk groups 
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holding a medical card and the majority of those in the reference category 
(Other adults with children) without either card (Figure 3.9). 
We also find a similar pattern across social class groups. Lower social class 
groups and unemployed class groups are unique in that most of these 
respondents hold a medical card, while in higher and middle social class 
groups most respondents do not have access to medical cards (Figure 3.10). 
This also confirms the previous findings that vulnerable groups are the most 
likely to receive the card. As before, the relationship is particularly strong 
when we focus on children under the age of 16. 
 
As with housing transfers, we find that medical cards are more common 
among those who are income poor, when compared to respondents who are 
not income poor. We also find that the majority of those in deprivation hold a 
medical card, while a majority of those who are not deprived have no access 
to either a medical card or a GP visit card. Lastly, we note that most 
respondents who are consistently poor hold a medical card, compared to 
those who are not consistently poor, where the majority holds neither card 
(Figure 3.12). 
 
Once again, we find that these tied transfers have a positive effect in that 
they lower the predicted probability of deprivation. However, we find that this 
effect does not differ strongly by social risk (Figure 3.15) or social class 
(Figure 3.17) groups. We note that unemployed respondents and 
respondents with a disability see a stronger effect when deprivation is split 
into a binary variable (‘deprived’ and ‘not deprived’). For example, our 
simulation shows that adults with a disability report a one percentage point 
decrease in their predicted probability of deprivation, after we account for the 
value of transfers, while the decline is far smaller for working aged adults 
without a disability (less than 0.25 percentage points). In terms of social 
class, those who have never worked report a one percentage point fall in 
their predicted probability of deprivation after considering the value of 
transfers tied to health, while those in the highest social class see a far 




Key findings: Childcare transfers and services 
Childcare transfers are particularly important in Ireland since formal childcare 
services are not strictly universal. We summarise the main available 
childcare schemes and services, noting the supports designed with social 
risk and social class groups in mind. CSO figures show that children under 
the age of 18 are the most likely to experience deprivation when compared 
with other age groups (Figure 4.1). However, within age groups, younger 
children (aged 0-5) are the least likely to experience deprivation when 
compared to households with older children (Figure 4.2).  
 
Results suggest that childcare use is lowest among deprived households 
when compared to non-deprived households. However, when we restrict our 
analysis to households with children aged 3-5, we find higher rates of 
childcare participation and less inequality between deprivation groups 
(Figure 4.3). This result could stem from the government childcare schemes 
which target children aged 3-5. We also find that households reporting 
deprivation cite fewer hours of childcare when compared to households who 
are not deprived (Figure 4.4). 
 
We find minor differences in the use of childcare between social risk groups 
(Figure 4.5) but wider differences in the quantity of childcare that users cite 
(Figure 4.6). Working age adults with children cite the most hours, while 
adults with a disability and lone parents cite the least number of hours. 
Likewise, we find a similar difference in terms of social class groups, with 
higher social class groups citing more care, and middle and lower social 
class groups citing less care (Figure 4.8). 
 
Our simulation results show that childcare subsidies are associated with 
lower deprivation. We find that lone parents have the most to gain from 
these subsidies, while other working age adults have the least to gain 
(Figure 4.10). Considering the value of transfers, lone parents saw a fall in 
predicted probability of deprivation of almost three percentage points. We 
also find that, in social class terms, unemployed households have the most 
to gain from childcare subsidies than the other social class groups (Figure 
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4.12). This group also saw a fall in the predicted probability of deprivation of 
four percentage points. 
 
Key findings: Cumulative effects of transfers 
Finally, we consider the cumulative effects of these three sets of tied 
transfers. We note that most respondents receive at least one transfer but 
this average masks large differences between social risk and social class 
groups. For example, across social risk groups, most lone parents receive 
two or more sets of transfers (48 per cent), while a significant portion of 
respondents with a disability (40 per cent) and older respondents (70 per 
cent) receive one set of transfers. Regarding social class groups, we also 
find that the highest social class respondents are the least likely to receive 
two or more sets of transfers and that 39 per cent receive none of the 
transfers. This distribution differs for middle, lowest, and unemployed social 
class groups who are most likely to use just one set of transfers. 
 
We then considered the difference in deprivation between those who receive 
no tied transfers, those who receive one set of transfers, and those who 
receive two sets of transfers. Respondents who receive transfers cite higher 
levels of deprivation, with respondents who receive multiple transfers citing 
the highest rates. However, this difference can be explained by social risk, 
social class, and the financial wellbeing of the household. 
 
Finally, our simulations find an association between tied transfers and lower 
rates of deprivation, with vulnerable groups benefitting the most from 
transfers and the greatest effect seen where the respondent relies on more 
than one set of transfers. Lone parents who receive two or more transfers 
saw an over three percentage point fall in their chances of deprivation, after 
we considered the value of transfers. In comparison, working age adults 
(“Other adults” in the figures) who received two or more transfers saw a less 











Social transfers give crucial supports to vulnerable families, providing access 
to important services (like medical care or childcare options), without which 
they would face greater risk of social exclusion. This study compares the 
distribution of specific transfers tied to housing, health, and childcare, and 
the association between these and deprivation in Ireland (2017). Specifically, 
we will estimate the social risk and social class differences in access to 
transfers and their association with deprivation. Deprivation is the inability to 
afford basic goods and services, like new clothes, a warm coat and 
replacement of furniture (Whelan and Maitre, 2006). This measure is 
different to income poverty, which is traditionally used in analyses of 
transfers. 
 
Studies of transfers typically look at the impact on cash transfers on poverty 
(Savage et al., 2019; Watson and Maitre, 2013) but recipients of such 
transfers are often entitled to a range of additional, non-cash transfers, 
services, and supports, designed to limit the experience of poverty and 
deprivation. In this study we will explore the association between these 
transfers and the deprivation of vulnerable groups in Ireland. 
 
This project has three aims. First, we will explore the coverage of transfers, 
considering these overall and how they differ by social risk and social class 
groups. Second, we will consider differences in deprivation between transfer 
recipients and non-recipients. Third, we consider households’ chances of 
deprivation with and without the transfers, using a simulation. Throughout 
the report we focus on three specific tied transfers: housing, which take the 
form of Rent Supplement and Mortgage Interest Scheme Supplements, 
while others are non-cash housing benefits tied to energy, television, and 
heating; healthcare, which take the form of medical cards and GP visit 
cards; childcare, which consider the imputed cost of universal non-cash 
childcare support. In a concluding chapter, we will consider the impact of all 
three transfers together. 
 
Social transfers are designed to reduce income poverty and deprivation. 
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Governments across Europe, regardless of welfare regime or ideological 
stance, commit some portion of their annual budget to these (Notten, 2016). 
However, countries differ in their generosity and their preference for transfer 
types, focusing on some combination of means-tested and universal, cash 
and non-cash transfers. While most researchers explore the impact of 
income transfers on poverty, they less often consider non-cash or in-kind 
transfers (Russell and Nolan, 2000; Savage et al., 2019). Further, authors 
often use income poverty as an outcome, rather than measures of material 
deprivation. However, those who explore the impact of transfers on 
deprivation routinely find a negative association between the two (Notten, 
2015, 2016; Nelson, 2012; Saunders and Wong, 2011). Our work builds on 
these contributions but also revisits previous research, which explored the 
link between social transfers and income poverty in Ireland (Watson and 
Maitre, 2013). In this report we dig deeper, looking at the association 
between the listed transfers and material deprivation.  
 
1.2 Framing social transfers, recipients and their effects 
This section outlines the theoretical framework between social transfers and 
consumption; more specifically it outlines the association between market 
income, transfers, and deprivation. In an economy there are households 
whose market incomes are below average. In many of these, financing basic 
costs is difficult. This difficulty (income poverty) leads to consumption 
difficulties (material deprivation). While income poverty is calculated using a 
household’s income relative to a benchmark (commonly 60% of median 
household disposable income), material deprivation is an objective measure 
of what a household can and cannot afford, using measures of what is 
generally considered “a customary life” (Nelson 2012; Watson and Maitre, 
2013; Whelan et al, 1996). Notten (2015) suggests income poverty is “a 
monetary, indirect, resource-based indicator”, while material deprivation is 
“an adverse material outcome resulting from a lack of financial means and is 
thus a non-monetary, direct, outcome-based indicator”. 
 
In order to limit the impact of low market income on poverty and deprivation, 
the welfare state supplements household income directly (by cash transfers) 
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or indirectly (by offering non-cash or in-kind transfers such as supplemented 
medical cards) (Barr, 2012; Sen, 1997). The question for state actors is 
therefore who should qualify for these transfers and whether or not these 
transfers are effective (Atkinson, 1998). Gaps between market income and 
necessities lead to deprivation, as a result transfers would ideally bridge this 
gap. Throughout this report, we will focus on the association between 
transfers and material deprivation. While income poverty was a commonly 
studied indicator across Europe, it became apparent that income poverty 
failed to capture several differences in living standards (Nelson, 2012) as 
well as the effects of economic cycle in periods of economic growth and 
recession. Examining the link between transfers and measures of 
deprivation is a way to address some of the shortcomings of a focus solely 
on income poverty.  
 
1.3 Social transfers, income and non-cash benefits 
Alleviating poverty is a goal for all national welfare states. This is achieved 
through diverse combinations of service provision, income transfers, and 
benefits. Generally, income transfers and benefits are designed to guard 
against economic shocks, to provide redistribution over the life course, and 
to consider different needs between social groups at different life stages and 
with changing economic circumstances (Atkinson, 1995).  
 
Broadly speaking, country poverty rates fall with increased social spending 
(Notten, 2015). Due to pressure from recession and subsequent austerity, 
welfare states have had to achieve more with less (Watson and Maitre, 
2013) and transfers and benefits have become subject to scrutiny for their 
effectiveness and efficiency (Notten 2015; LeFebvre, 2007; Caminada and 
Goudswaard, 2010; Esping Andersen and Myles, 2009). In the following, we 
summarise the main impacts of these transfers below, focusing first on 
income poverty and then on deprivation.  
 
1.3.1 Social transfers and income poverty 
Regarding who receives transfers, Notten (2015) finds that most income 
transfers go to the lowest income quintile, and that households in upper 
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quintiles rarely receive transfers. Notten (2015) also shows wide differences 
between six European countries (Germany, France, Ireland, the 
Netherlands, Sweden, and the UK) in the share of respondents receiving 
transfers and the types of transfers received (housing, family, or social 
assistance). Ireland has a particularly high share of households receiving 
any kind of transfer (70%), when compared to the UK (39%) and Sweden 
(33%). This is especially true for Ireland’s transfers tied to housing (30%), 
which are far higher than those in Germany (0.43%) and Sweden (9.5%). 
This difference is likely related to country differences in the provision of 
services (like social housing) versus country differences in the use of 
transfers (like housing related benefits for use in the private market). Notten 
(2016) also finds broad country differences in the average value of income 
transfers between six European countries,5 with recipients in the UK 
(€5,796) and Ireland (€5,130) receiving higher amounts than Germany 
(€3,789) or the Netherlands (€3,664). In short, Ireland’s transfers cover a 
significant portion of the population, and the average transfer is more 
generous in Ireland when compared to other European countries. Callan et 
al. (2018a) also note that Ireland’s income transfers played an important role 
in limiting the potential increase in inequality following Ireland’s 2008 
recession. After the economic downturn, more people became dependent on 
welfare support, which in turn limited inequality increases through the tax-
benefit system. 
 
Regarding the effects of transfers, several authors find a negative 
association between transfers and income poverty. Notten and Guio (2016) 
show a basic negative association between income transfers and post-
transfer levels of income poverty risk. There is also evidence that certain 
transfers are more effective than others in this regard. Miežienė and 
Krutulienė (2019) find that transfers designed to limit social exclusion and 
transfers that target spending on children and the family have the greatest 
impact on poverty reduction, compared to other transfer types. Using Irish 
SILC data, Watson and Maitre (2013) consider the impact of transfers on the 
 
                                                             
 
5 Figures are nominal, not PPP adjusted. 
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poverty gap (the difference between market income and the poverty 
threshold). They find that transfers covered 84 per cent of the gap in 2004 
and 88 per cent of the gap in 2011. This effect also had group differences, 
ranging from 84 per cent for working-age adults to 95 per cent for retirement 
age adults (2011), again suggesting that vulnerable households benefit most 
from transfers. The effect was also observed for children, with the pre-
transfer poverty gap reduced by 87 per cent after transfers. 
 
There is also evidence that transfer types are effective across a range of 
countries. Chzhen and Bradshaw (2012) report that transfers reduce income 
poverty in a sample of lone parent families from several European countries. 
This effect remains even when controlling for GDP per capita differences 
between countries, which reduce but do not eliminate the effects of transfers.  
Chzhen and Bradshaw (2012) also find significant differences in who 
experiences poverty and the importance of household composition when 
thinking about transfers and poverty. They claim lone fathers are less likely 
to experience income poverty than lone mothers, and that younger 
householders are more likely to be in poverty when compared to older heads 
of household. However, it is not clear whether there are group differences in 
the effect of income transfers on poverty; for example, whether income 
transfers for lone mothers are more effective than income transfers for lone 
fathers in alleviating income poverty (Chzhen and Bradshaw, 2012).  
1.3.2 Social transfers and deprivation 
A key group of authors also consider deprivation as an outcome. Starting 
with the general link between transfers and deprivation, the highest quintile 
of deprivation is the most likely to receive income transfers, across a range 
of European countries (Notten 2016).  
 
Income transfers also reduce the likelihood of experiencing deprivation 
(Notten and Guio, 2016; Notten, 2015, 2016), but this link is less 
straightforward than the relationship between income transfers and income 
poverty, because measures of poverty and transfers rely on a €1-to-€1 
relationship. Thus, Notten (2016) highlights that deprivation may be further 
affected by debt or wealth, access to non-financial resources, and the 
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general needs of the household (childcare, elder care, and family size). 
These measures cannot be assigned a euro value but may affect a 
household’s ability to consume certain essential goods. 
 
Regarding country differences, there is a negative relationship between 
country levels of social assistance and country levels of deprivation (Nelson, 
2012). There are also country differences in the importance of individual 
level predictors when estimating deprivation, with low-assistance countries 
showing the strongest link between individual level factors and deprivation. 
In this way, among countries with low support, individual characteristics are 
a better predictor of deprivation than they are in countries with high support. 
Here too Chzhen and Bradshaw (2012) find that social transfer generosity6 
limits the respondent’s likelihood of experiencing deprivation, although 
country GDP levels may be a stronger predictor of this outcome. Overall, 
deprivation levels differ by country, and generosity of transfers may explain 
some of these differences. 
 
Regarding group differences, household composition is again cited as an 
important factor. Deprivation is highest among single respondents, lone 
parents, unemployed respondents or those with only a primary education 
(Nelson, 2012). Elsewhere, Chzhen and Bradshaw (2012) report that lone 
parent mothers are more likely to experience deprivation when compared to 
lone parent fathers, and that larger lone parent families have a greater 
likelihood of experiencing deprivation, when compared to smaller families. 
Regarding group differences in the effects of transfers on deprivation, 
Saunders and Wong (2011) report that respondents with a disability, lone 
parents, and the unemployed see small deprivation-reducing effects after 
transfers, while older respondents see greater effects. 
 
In short, material deprivation differs between social risk groups and between 
countries. Further, income transfers are associated with lower rates of 
 
                                                             
 
6 “Social transfers include all contributory and non-contributory individual and family level cash benefits 
including unemployment benefits and disability benefits, housing allowances and family/child related 
allowances, but not including old age and survivors benefits which are treated as original (before transfers) 
income in this analysis.” Chzen and Bradshaw (2012, p.494) 
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deprivation. Generally, there is little written about links between transfers 
and deprivation, thus the purpose of this report is to contribute knowledge to 
this area. 
 
1.3.3 Non-cash transfers 
In the poverty literature, there is a large body of research on the role of cash 
transfers to alleviate poverty but much less so on non-cash benefits and the 
motivations for such policy. Currie and Gahvari (2008) provide a detailed 
account of many different theoretical explanations for non-cash benefits as 
part of government social welfare policies. According to the authors, there 
are two main justification for non-cash benefits; paternalistic and egalitarian 
viewpoints. In paternalistic approaches, societies provide non-cash benefits 
to recipients (who may prefer cash) as a way of controlling aid and welfare. 
In egalitarian approaches, non-cash benefits are the result of a wider desire 
to help individuals secure basic rights to goods and services like adequate 
food, access to medical services, education or housing. As a result these are 
provided directly via non-cash benefit. As the two approaches show, non-
cash transfers may not be a universal solution to deprivation, and may rely 
on the wider system of welfare in a given society.  
 
Nonetheless, non-cash transfers may have important effects on income 
poverty and deprivation, in that they provide specific resources (like medical 
cards) rather than cash transfers. In this way, they are particularly important 
in alleviating deprivation. Those receiving cash transfers are often entitled to 
many non-cash transfers such free heating, electricity, television, and other 
forms of assistance like access to social housing. The literature differs in 
terms of how to add a cash value to services such as the medical card and 
childcare. In the next few paragraphs we consider non-cash transfers and 
their valuation.  
 
Non-cash transfers help households at the bottom of the income distribution 
to cover the most basic costs of housing, medical, and childcare services. 
Russell and Nolan (2001) estimate that 61 per cent of medical card spending 
goes to households in the bottom 30 per cent of the income distribution. The 
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authors also argue that the elderly have the greatest access to medical 
cards, while the working poor, those who are unemployed, and those with 
large families have less access to medical cards. Despite this, imputing a 
monetary value to the schemes is not straightforward, although authors have 
been able to value certain non-cash transfers (Russell and Nolan, 2000; 
Callan and Keane, 2009; Callan et al., 2018b).  
 
There are two issues with assigning a value to non-cash benefits. The first is 
that recipients of in-kind transfers may be worse off than similar recipients 
who do not receive the transfer. For example, Callan and Keane (2009) 
suggest the biggest consumers of health services are not those with more 
“total resources” but rather those with the biggest demand for health services 
(possibly due to illness or a disability). Thus, assigning a cash value to 
consumers of several healthcare procedures means they cannot be 
considered “better off” or “less deprived” when compared to similar people 
who consume fewer health services. A second issue is the gap between 
qualifying for transfers and uptake of services, Callan et al., (2018b) found 
that despite entitlements to medical and GP visit cards, there are gaps in 
their take-up; suggesting that entitled non-recipients may not necessarily 
need such transfers or benefit from them. 
 
Non-cash transfers are often found to have the biggest impact on families 
with children and the elderly, and the lowest impact on single households 
and young families without children (Saunders et al., 1992). Speaking on the 
importance of education, and health related transfers, they write: 
“the impact of noncash income is best viewed within a life cycle 
context. Education accrues to families with school age children, while 
health care benefits – though received by all – are disproportionately 
high for the elderly, particularly the very old. The inclusion of noncash 
income thus has the largest impact on the final incomes, and hence 
average living standards and poverty rates, of families with children 
and the elderly.” (Saunders et al., 1992, p.33) 
 
Researchers differ in their approach to estimating the value of a service, 
especially one that is provided free or at a reduced fee. Some take an 
 
Page 33 
accounting approach, where the cost of the services provision is attached to 
the service itself. A second approach (subjective and more difficult) is to ask 
people to value access to the service themselves, although this leads to 
different estimates, depending on respondent characteristics, circumstances, 
and preferences (Smeeding, 1982). The most common approach is the risk-
related approach, which is based on cost of service per capita. Rather than 
applying the same average value to everyone irrespective of some of their 
characteristics, they receive a value corresponding to the average usage by 
their gender and age group. This method has been used in Ireland for the 
valuation of medical card (Savage et al., 2016; Russell and Nolan, 2001), as 
well as internationally (Saunders et al.,1992; Donaldson et al., 2002).  
 
1.4 Data and Measurement  
We draw on Ireland’s Survey of Income and Living Conditions (SILC). We 
use the 2017 wave of data, which records individual and household 
composition measures as well as income, and transfer receipt in the areas of 
housing, medical cards, and childcare.7  
 
Importantly, the 2017 survey does not consider receipt of Housing 
Assistance Payments (discussed in detail in Chapter 2). This scheme was 
launched in 2014 and became nationally available in 2017. It is a scheme 
that pays a proportion of private market rent directly to the landlord on the 
tenant’s behalf. The scheme has become an important part of Ireland’s 
housing provision policy, outlined in Rebuilding Ireland.8 However, data on 
the scheme does not feature in SILC 2017.  
 
The purpose of Ireland’s SILC is to provide individual level and household 
level statistics on income, living standards, poverty, deprivation, and 
inequality (CSO, 2017, p.87). We are particularly interested in transfers tied 
to housing, childcare, and medical services, and the social risk and social 
 
                                                             
 
7 SILC 2017 was the most recent SILC wave available at the time of the data analysis for this report. 




class differences in these measures. We are also interested in how these 
measures impact deprivation, and the social risk and social class differences 
in who experiences deprivation.  
 
A major strength of the survey is that cash and some non-cash benefit 
figures do not rely on the respondent’s recall and are instead gathered from 
administrative sources using their Personal Public Service number.9 In this 
way the data can capture the exact size and scope of benefits and 
allowances. Another significant strength of the survey is that it contains 
many of the important controls mentioned in the review summary above. 
Using SILC, we can control for many of the measures noted above, like 
family size and household composition, as well as the main characteristics of 
the head of the household. These measures are important predictors of 
deprivation.  
 
1.4.1 Housing transfers, medical cards, and 
childcare subsidies 
Using the SILC, we outline and define housing, medical, and childcare 
transfers. These three transfer types were chosen because of their 
significance in terms of number of recipients and because of data availability. 
First, starting with housing transfers, Ireland’s SILC considers two measures 
of Total Housing Allowances which are imputed using a respondent’s PPS 
number. These transfers are the only ones related to housing which are 
available to us in SILC. Other transfers exist, as mentioned above, however 
we focus only on housing transfers as they appear in SILC 2017. The first is 
made up of housing supplements, Rent Allowance, Rent Supplement, 
Mortgage Interest Supplement, Exceptional Needs Payments, and Heat 
Supplement (measured together). In order to simplify our analysis, we focus 
only on households who receive Rent Allowance, Rent Supplement, and 
Mortgage Interest Supplement; in short, we ignore transfers tied to 
 
                                                             
 
9 Childcare support and medical card/GP visit card values are estimated separately, as described in 
corresponding chapters below. 
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Exceptional Needs Payments and Heat Supplements.10 The second is made 
up of housing benefits including Free TV license, Energy Allowance, Fuel 
Allowance, Telephone Support Allowance,11 and a Water Conservation 
Grant (measured together). Using these measures, we can discern between 
four groups of households: 
• Those not in receipt of any housing transfers. 
• Those in receipt of Housing Supplements only.  
• Those in receipt of Housing Benefits only.  
• Those in receipt of Housing Supplements and Housing Benefits.  
 
Due to CSO publication guidelines on cell size we sometimes collapse these 
categories into a simplified measure capturing those who receive and those 
who do not receive any type of housing transfer. This simplified measure 
masks significant differences in access and total benefit received. However, 
it is the best measure available to us. Beyond who receives benefits, we also 
consider the total amount received in these four categories (with the 
reference category, those not in receipt of any housing allowance, always 
set to 0). 
 
Second, Ireland’s SILC considers whether adults hold a medical card, a GP 
visit card or neither. The survey also captures whether children under the 
age of 12 in the household hold a medical card, a GP visit card, or neither. 
We impute a value to these cards using data from the Primary Care 
Reimbursement Service annual statistics and from the SWITCH database.12 
In this way we can compare the following groups: 
• Households receiving neither card. 
• Households receiving a medical card. 
• Households receiving a GP card. 
 
Finally, the SILC dataset contains information about the presence and age of 
 
                                                             
 
10 We ignored these transfers as their monetary value is small relative to wider housing transfers. 
11 This scheme no longer exists. 
12 SWITCH is the ESRI’s tax benefit model based on the CSO SILC data. The model can simulate the effect of 
changes to the tax and welfare system on household income. 
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children in the household and the number of weekly hours spent by each 
child (up to the age of 12) in different forms of childcare (none, formal 
childcare,13 relatives or family). Using subsidies information from the 
Department of Children, Equality, Disability, Integration and Youth (DCEDIY) 
and simulation from the SWITCH model, we allocate the value of a childcare 
transfer to the income of a household. This value is the same as the 
subsidies provided by DCEDIY to the childcare providers, except we assume 
that this value is paid to the household. We develop this process further in 
the childcare chapter. 
 
1.4.2 Identifying vulnerable groups – Social class 
groups 
Social classes are groups that share a common set of resources, and a 
common level of access to life chances (Goldthorpe and Jackson 2007; 
Friedman et al., 2015). Class differences in resources include difference in 
capital, social capital, skills, and organisation-specific knowledge. Class 
differences in life chances include employment, promotion, and other 
economic opportunities, such as working in a protected occupation. Class 
categories capture not only a person’s current situation but also their ability 
to maintain their status despite shocks like illness, job loss, and early 
retirement (Friedman et al., 2015). 
 
We define social class groups using the occupation-based European 
Socioeconomic Classification (ESeC), which draws on the work of John 
Goldthorpe and Robert Erikson (1992). Our focus is the social class position 
of the head of the household (the person responding to the household 
questionnaire, identified as the main person responsible for housing costs). 
We apply their social class value to the household. Because of the small 
sizes of some social class groups and to comply with CSO statistical rules, 
we aggregate and simplify these groups into just four categories: 
• High social class – defined as managerial and professional 
 
                                                             
 
13 Formal childcare is defined as childcare provided by a waged employee in a formal setting, it does not 
include private childminders. 
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occupational positions (ESeC classes 1 and 2).  
• Middle social class, including other technical and white-collar 
occupations, the self-employed and farmers (ESeC classes 3, 4 
and 5).  
• Lowest social class – including skilled and semiskilled manual and 
routine non-manual occupations (ESeC classes 6 to 9). 
• Unemployed or those who have never worked. These 
respondents are the most limited in terms of resources in that they 
have limited access to the market (ESeC code 10). 
 
1.4.3 Identifying vulnerable groups – Social risk 
groups 
Social risk groups are distinguished on the basis of non-class characteristics 
that result in differences in their risk of poverty and deprivation (Watson et 
al., 2016). Lone parents, older adults, children, the unemployed, and people 
with a disability are limited in their access to employment and the extent to 
which they can participate in labour market. Social risk groups are different 
to social class groups in that they offer additional explanations for the risk of 
poverty or exclusion (Watson et al., 2016). Drawing on earlier work which 
examined the evolution of income poverty and deprivation over the life cycle, 
Watson et al. (2016) frame social risk groups as those who differ in their risk 
of poverty due to non-class, personal, or family factors that restrict their 
capacity to meet their need through the market. This report focuses on three 
drivers of social risk: 
• Life course stage: Children and people older than working age are 
vulnerable to social exclusion and deprivation because of reduced 
(or no) access to employment in their own right. 
• Personal resources: Illness or disability potentially limits a 
person’s work capacity. Further, illness and recovery involves 
additional costs in treatment, medication, and aids (Cullinan, 
Gannon and O’Shea 2013). Disability may also be penalised in 
the labour market through discrimination or unaccommodating 
facilities.  
• Non-work caring responsibilities: responsibility for childcare or 
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others who have an illness or infirmity limits a person’s capacity to 
engage in employment. 
 
Respondents who are at risk of deprivation and income poverty are the most 
likely to benefit from cash and non-cash transfers alike. Households that are 
particularly prone to poverty, despite their social class, are those with 
children, those with older adults, and those where someone has a disability 
(NESC, 2005). Elsewhere, studies have found that lone parents are at risk of 
social deprivation and poverty (Watson et al., 2016). The remaining group, 
that of working age adults who are neither lone parents, nor someone with a 
disability or living with an adult with a disability, have a lower risk of poverty 
and deprivation. As a result, we consider them the reference social risk 
category to which we compare the remaining groups. Our social risk groups 
are therefore: 
• Lone parents and their children. 
• Individuals (including children) in households where at least one 
working-age member has a disability (which may be the 
respondent).  
• Individuals aged over 65.  
• Working age adults who are not lone parents, and who do not 
have a disability, and their children (the reference category). 
 
We consider social class and social risk groups as both important in 
determining deprivation and the need for non-cash benefits. These two 
concepts, although aimed at capturing the socioeconomic resources that 
individuals and households have, only partially overlap. In fact, while social 
class captures differences in market power, social risk captures barriers to 
accessing the market in the first place. Both are important predictors of 
differences in life chances. 
 
1.4.4 Deprivation and income poverty 
Within SILC, income is measured at the household level over the twelve 
months preceding the interview. All income sources of all household 
members are included. As well as weekly social welfare payments, less 
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frequent payments are also included (such as Child Benefit, which is paid 
monthly, and payments such as Back to School Clothing and Footwear 
Allowance) along with the cash value of near-cash benefits (e.g. free 
electricity, gas and TV licence). In constructing the indicator of at-risk-of-
poverty, we take disposable income – the level of household income after 
tax and social transfers such as pension or unemployment benefits. The 
measurement of at-risk-of-poverty also takes account of household size and 
composition by using an equivalised scale. This involves an adjustment to 
income so that we can compare incomes of households that differ in size. 
The Irish national equivalised scale allows a weight of 1 for the first adult in a 
household, 0.66 for each subsequent adult (over the age of 14) and 0.33 for 
each child. Equivalised income is a household’s disposable income divided 
by the household equivalisation scale. A household is at-risk-of-poverty if its 
equivalised income is below 60 per cent of the median equivalised income.  
 
Deprivation is defined as the ability to afford a list of basic goods and 
services (Whelan and Maitre, 2007). They are: 
• Two pairs of strong shoes 
• A warm waterproof overcoat 
• Buy new (not second-hand) clothes 
• Eat meal with meat, chicken, fish (or vegetarian equivalent) every 
second day 
• Have a roast joint or its equivalent once a week 
• Had to go without heating during the last year through lack of 
money 
• Keep the home adequately warm 
• Buy presents for family or friends at least once a year 
• Replace any worn out furniture 
• Have family or friends for a drink or meal once a month 
• Have a morning, afternoon or evening out in the last fortnight for 
entertainment 
 
We consider people who are unable to afford two or more of the listed items 





1.5 Estimating the relationship between transfers 
and deprivation 
The relationship between low income households and the experience of 
deprivation is well established (Calandrino, 2003; Whelan and Maître, 2006), 
though the overlap between income poverty and material deprivation is not 
perfect (Whelan and Maître, 2006). To illustrate the relationship between 
income and deprivation, results from SILC 2017 (CSO, 2018) show, for 
example, that 44 per cent and 39 per cent respectively of the two bottom-
income deciles are deprived (lacking at least two items) while it is three per 
cent and less than two per cent for those in the ninth and top income decile. 
The aim of the modelling exercise in the first part of the report is to establish 
a formal relationship between income and deprivation while taking account 
of other characteristics that would be associated with income, such as the 
person’s level of education or the household size.  
 
We use static simulation to estimate the association between transfers and 
deprivation as proposed by Notten and Guio (2016). That is, we treat SILC’s 
measure of deprivation as a categorical and ordinal measure, as have other 
authors (Notten and Guio, 2016, forthcoming). We treat each value of 
deprivation as a category and so estimate the likelihood of moving to a 
higher value of deprivation for each control (Freese and Long, 2006; Rabe-
Hesketh and Skrondal, 2008). Several types of regressions can be used 
when using a count dependent variable. We follow the Notten and Guio 
(forthcoming) approach by comparing five types of regressions in order to 
identify the model that fits the data best and that we will use for the rest of 
the analysis. 
 
We include a summary table of several regression models in the appendix. 
We chose to estimate the association between transfers and deprivation 
 
                                                             
 




using ordinal logistic regression, since these models produced the lowest 
values for both the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and Bayesian 
Information Criterion (BIC). Notten and Guio (forthcoming) use the same 
approach for the same reason.  
 
The regressions used for the comparisons are a Poisson regression, a 
Negative binomial regression, a Zero-inflated regression, a Generalized 
ordered logit regression, and an Ordered logit regression. We compare 
these with an Ordinary least squares regression (OLS). For each of these 
regressions, the dependant variable is the count number of deprivation items 
ranging from 0 to 11; we include several control variables, such as individual 
and household characteristics that are likely to be associated with material 
deprivation.  
 
Once we estimate the basic group differences in deprivation, we use post 
estimation techniques to consider the predicted probability of citing each 
deprivation category. Using this model, we then capture the difference in 
deprivation with and without transfers, by first estimating the predicted 
probability of being deprived, controlling for gross household income. When 
estimated, we then add the value of transfers into the measure of household 
income, and again estimate the predicted probability of being deprived. The 
difference between these two predictions is the association between 
transfers and deprivation. We present the most basic model in the section 
below. We consider the impact of transfers using this model in each 
subsequent chapter.  
 
1.6 Estimating deprivation and group differences in 
deprivation 
In order to simulate the impact of transfers on deprivation, we use a basic 
model to consider the chance of deprivation and the group differences in this 
chance. Specifically, we consider three models which estimate the likelihood 
of experiencing higher deprivation. The first models consider the social risk 
and social class groups. The second adds the characteristics of the head of 
the household. The final set considers household income, our key measure 
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for simulating the effects of transfers in later chapters, and the 
characteristics of the household. Using a model that considers only the 
impact of income on deprivation would give a biased estimate because there 
are several other factors which impact deprivation such as social risk and 
social class membership, even when measures of income are held constant. 
We will use the coefficients in Model 3 as the main predictors of deprivation 
with and without transfers. Before we consider this, however, we will note the 




TABLE 1.1: ORDINAL LOGISTIC REGRESSION ESTIMATING DEPRIVATION 
 
Model 1  Model 2 Model 3 
 
Deprivation Deprivation Deprivation 
VARIABLES 
   
    
Ref: Older adults 
   
Lone parents 6.09*** 4.24*** 1.61 
Disability 5.19*** 2.98*** 1.89** 
Working age adults 1.60*** 1.25 0.88 
    
Ref: High & lower professional 
   
Inter/tech/self-employed 1.77*** 1.45** 1.08 
Lower service/unskilled manual 2.89*** 2.01*** 1.44* 
Unemployed/never worked 5.31*** 2.42** 1.38 
    
Ref: Head of household male  
  
Head of household female  1.26* 1.47** 
Age of head of household 
 
0.99* 1.01 
Ref: Head of household non-Irish  
  
Head of household Irish 
 
0.85 0.57** 
    
Ref: Head of household working  
  
Head of household unemployed  3.50*** 2.30*** 
Head of household in education  1.84 1.31 
Head of household in home duties  1.71** 1.11 
Head of household retired  0.94 0.9 
Head of household ill/disabled 
 
4.16*** 2.88*** 
Head of household not yet at work  2.28* 0.83 
    
Ref: Head of hh has tertiary degree  
 
Head of hh has primary education  1.79*** 1.49* 
Head of hh has secondary education  1.36* 1.33* 
    
Equivalised household income  
 
0.39*** 
    
Ref: 2 adult household 
   
1 adult household 
  
1.17 





1 adult with children <18 
  
1.33 
2 adults with children <18 
  
1.19 
Other households with children <18  
 
1.38 
    
Number of children <18 
  
1.08 
Number of adults 18-65 
  
0.96 






    
/cut1 6.86*** 4.18*** 0.00*** 
/cut2 15.67*** 10.00*** 0.00*** 
/cut3 26.90*** 17.65*** 0.00*** 
/cut4 46.36*** 31.10*** 0.01*** 
/cut5 74.06*** 50.43*** 0.01*** 
/cut6 122.78*** 84.84*** 0.01*** 
/cut7 231.09*** 162.19*** 0.03** 
/cut8 544.97*** 388.07*** 0.07* 
/cut9 1,082.30*** 775.03*** 0.13 
/cut10 2,305.76*** 1,653.85*** 0.28 
/cut11 31,925.03*** 22,935.27*** 3.94 
    
Observations 12,251 12,251 12,251 
 
The first set of estimates (Model 1) considers differences in social risk and 
social class in the likelihood of experiencing higher rates of deprivation. 
Starting with social risk, we note wide differences between groups: lone 
parents, working age adults, and respondents with a disability have a 
significantly higher chance of experiencing deprivation when compared to 
older adults (those aged over 65). Differences also emerge for social class, 
with intermediate, lower, and unemployed classes having greater chances of 
higher deprivation when compared to the highest social class group (High 
occupations and lower professionals). These effects are predictable, with 
vulnerable groups citing a greater chance of experiencing deprivation.  
 
We can explain part of this difference by considering the characteristics of 
the head of the household. We do this in Model 2, noting that the gender, 
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age, and nationality of the head of the households explain part of the effects 
of social risk and social class. The economic status and educational 
attainment of the head of the household also closes some of the gaps 
between social risk and social class groups. With these factors in mind, we 
now see than lone parents are now four times more likely than older 
respondents to cite higher levels of deprivation, and respondents with a 
disability are three times more likely to cite higher deprivation when 
compared to respondents over 65.  
 
Regarding social class groups, the middle social class group is now 1.4 
times more likely to cite greater deprivation when compared to the highest 
social class group. The lowest social class group is two times more likely to 
cite greater deprivation when compared to the highest social class. Finally, 
the unemployed group are 2.4 time more likely to cite deprivation. Although 
the characteristics of the household explain some of these differences, social 
risk and social class groups still have an impact on deprivation, even when 
we consider these factors.  
 
Lastly, we consider the impact of equivalised household income and general 
household composition. With these measures added to the model, social risk 
and social class differences are now minor. For social risk, the only 
significant difference is that between older adults and respondents with a 
disability. For social class, the only difference is between the highest social 
class and the lowest social class. Importantly, equivalised household income 
has a strong and negative effect on the likelihood of citing higher levels of 
deprivation (0.39 decrease in odds for every unit increase in equivalised 
household income). 
 
All statistical models can present advantages and limits. One issue in the 
model specification that could affect our results is based on the assumption 
in ordinal logistic regression (“assumption of proportional odds”) that the 
effects of the independent variables are proportional across the different 
thresholds. So, taking the income variable as one of our independent 
variables, we assume that there is indeed a consistent effect of income 
across the different deprivation threshold. However, Guio et al. (2017) found 
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that the item composition of deprivation varies across deprivation levels, 
which could suggest that within the relationship between income level and 
deprivation items can vary. Some items can be regarded as “less severe” 
(going out with friends for example), while others are more basic items 
(being able to afford food/clothes). Guio et al. (2017: 35) found that at the 
lowest level of deprivation we tend to find “less severe” items. Another issue 
is that the measure of deprivation is not perfect as the level of deprivation 
can be underestimated as people adjust their preferences (Hallerod, 2006) 
or because of a weaker relationship between income and deprivation like for 
self-employment income, as shown by Whelan, Layte and Maître (2004). All 
these issues could affect substantially the coefficients in the regression 
models. 
 
In the next chapter we deal with the transfers tied to housing costs. Chapter 
3 considers medical and GP visit cards, Chapter 4 considers childcare, and 
Chapter 5 examines the cumulative effects of transfers. Chapter 6 concludes 











This chapter considers the distribution of housing transfers and the 
association between transfers and deprivation. Housing transfers are a key 
form of specific assistance, tackling one of the most important costs for 
individuals and families. These transfers take the form of housing 
supplements, covering the cost of rent or mortgage interest, and housing 
benefits, covering the cost of heating, electricity and other utilities. We ask 
two main questions throughout this chapter. Who receives which transfers? 
What is the association between receiving (and not receiving) transfers and 
deprivation after the characteristics of recipients are controlled for?  
 
Although important, we do not consider the role of public housing. Public 
housing likely has a significant impact on deprivation given that it is provided 
to tenants at a differential rate (Fahey, 1999). Neither do we consider users 
of the Housing Assistance Payment scheme, which does not feature in our 
dataset but which has become an important policy instrument for housing 
provision in Ireland. Despite these two omissions, we can capture the 
distribution of housing supplements and housing benefits, and their 
association with deprivation. 
2.1 Housing over time  
The cost and nature of housing has changed since 2002. Previous studies of 
non-cash benefits focused on imputed rents for homeowners (Callan and 
Keane, 2009). In this approach, authors focused on the imputed rent gained 
from home ownership. However, Ireland’s share of owner occupation 
declined from 74 per cent in 2002 to 68 per cent in 2016. During that time 
rental properties have grown in importance. Further, the costs associated 
with housing, especially housing in the rental sector, have also changed. 
These changes prompted the government to create new forms of support for 
those renting their homes in the public and private housing sector. 
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FIGURE 2.1: NATURE OF IRELAND’S HOUSING TENURE OVER TIME (2002-
2016) 
 
Source: Statbank Census data 2002-2016 for entire state 
Note:   Complicated forms of tenure, like rental from voluntary housing bodies and 
purchase of social housing units are marked “Other”.  
 
Figure 2.1 shows the pace of change in the composition of Ireland’s tenure 
types. Both the 2002 Census and the 2006 Census record a similar 
distribution of tenure types. However, the 2011 and 2016 Censuses record a 
sudden growth in the share of private rented accommodation, moving from 
10 per cent of all homes in 2006 to 19 per cent of all homes in 2011. During 
this time, the share of homes owned with a mortgage declined slightly from 
39 per cent in 2006 to 35 per cent in 2011 and 36 per cent in 2016. In short, 
the composition of the housing market has changed since 2006, where rates 
of ownership have fallen, while rates of renting have increased. Housing 
related benefits, as a result, must consider this change in the composition of 
tenure types. 
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FIGURE 2.2: AVERAGE MONTHLY RENT OF A TENANCY IN CO. DUBLIN  
(2008-2017) 
 
Source: RTB Average Monthly Rent Report by Property Type, Location, Number of 
Bedrooms and Year 
Note:   For illustrative purposes we show only results for Dublin, although the pattern of rent 
increases emerges in other counties.  
Note:  Prices are nominal.  
 
While the composition of the housing market has changed, the cost 
associated with the rental market has also changed. Figure 2.2 shows that in 
2017 the average cost of renting in Dublin has surpassed 2008 levels. This 
pressure is likely acute for families with children, where there is a 
requirement for larger accommodation but without the corresponding 
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FIGURE 2.3: HOUSING PRICE INDEX (2008-2017) 
 
Source: CSO Statbank figures  
 
Homeowners may also rely on income transfers tied to housing. Figure 2.3 
shows that home ownership costs, measured as the price of property, have 
also changed since 2012. The cost of homeownership, in Dublin and 
nationally, experienced a peak in 2007 and a trough in 2012. Since then, the 
cost of housing has risen steadily and is approaching 2005 levels, especially 
in County Dublin. This suggests that non-cash benefits for homeowners will 
also be important, especially for those who bought homes near the peak of 
the distribution, who may now be struggling with such costs.  
 
While this assistance took the form of the Mortgage Interest Scheme, there 
are two important points of note regarding the scheme. First, new 
applications to the scheme closed in January 2014, and payments were 
ended in December 2017. In short, the scheme no longer exists. However, 
we will use data from 2017 in our analysis, which captures beneficiaries of 
this scheme, and so we can make conclusions about the scheme. Second, 
this scheme strictly applied to interest payments only and did not apply to the 
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2.2 Housing benefits, allowance, and assistance 
over time 
Vulnerable households like those of people aged over 65, and households at 
risk of poverty and deprivation may be eligible for transfers which offset 
rental or mortgage interest costs, these take the form of housing 
supplements. They may also be eligible for assistance with heating, fuel, 
electricity, TV costs, and telephone costs. These take the form of housing 
benefits.15 Some of these schemes are currently discontinued.16 However, 
they were in existence when the data was collected and so can help 
understand the association between transfers and deprivation. Before 
looking at trends in transfers, we briefly describe the schemes tied to the 
cost of rent. We do this in Table 2.0 below.  
  
 
                                                             
 
15The package is designed for those aged 70 or over, regardless of whether they receive a State pension. The 
package is not means tested. DSP Note:  it is also available to people under 70 years of age, subject to certain 
conditions 
16The Mortgage Interest Payment scheme and Telephone Support Allowance scheme no longer exist. 
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TABLE 2.0: DESCRIPTION OF RENT SUPPLEMENT AND HOUSING 




The scheme was first introduced in 1977, and provides 
financial support to existing private sector tenants with 
a short-term difficulty in affording rent. The tenant must 
have been living in the rented accommodation (or 
social private homeless accommodation) for at least 
six months of the last year; have been able to afford 
the rent at the beginning of the tenancy and have 
difficulty affording it now due to a substantial change in 
circumstances (e.g. unemployment). Administered by 
the Department of Social Protection, RS is typically 
paid to people in receipt of a social protection payment 
and those in full-time employment are not eligible. RS 
tenancies constituted approximately 18 per cent of 
socially supported housing in 2016. This scheme is on-





This scheme was introduced to gradually replace long-
term RS recipients. Dwellings are provided through the 
private sector, the tenant must be assessed as being 
in housing need, the rent (which is subject to limits 
depending on the area) is paid directly to the landlord 
by the Local Authority and the tenant pays the relevant 
‘differential rent’ to the LA. HAP tenants may take up 
full-time employment while retaining the support. RS 
recipients who are assessed as being in long-term 
‘housing need’ must be transferred to the HAP on a 
phased basis. Tenants source their own 
accommodation and once approved for HAP are 
expected to remain for at least two years. 
Source: Details taken from Watson and Corrigan (2019); Details of other housing support 
schemes are outlined in Appendix Table A.2 
 
With these supports in mind, we consider the main patterns of Housing 
Supplements (tied to costs like rent) and Housing Benefits (tied to costs like 
 
                                                             
 
17 According to figures from the Department of Housing, Local Government and Heritage 




heating) over the last ten years. Figure 2.4 lists the DSP’s total spending on 
two sets of schemes. The first covers Rent Supplement, Rent Allowance, 
and Mortgage Interest Supplement. Rent Supplement, mentioned above, is 
designed for low income households living in the private sector. The scheme 
is still operational. Rental Allowance is payable to tenants “of certain 
dwellings affected by the decontrol of rents on 26th July 1982”. This scheme 
is designed with a unique group of tenants in mind, those affected by rent 
control legislation passed in July 1982. Mortgage Interest supplement, as 
mentioned above, provided short term income support to those unable to 
make mortgage interest payments. The scheme only applied to respondents’ 
family homes and did not cover payments on the mortgage’s principle. It 
ended in 2018. 
 
From the figure below, the total cost of these schemes gradually declined 
from 2011. Part of this decline can be explained by the gradual introduction 
of the Housing Assistance Payment scheme (outlined in Table 2.0) which 
was designed to gradually replace Rent Supplement, although both schemes 
are in existence at the time of writing.  
 
For reference only, we include Budget allocation figures for the HAP 
scheme. It is important to note that this data is taken from a different source 
to the other schemes and so may not be comparable. As data on HAP 
spending was not available in the Statistical Information on Social Welfare 
Services Annual Report (2018), these details were instead taken from 




FIGURE 2.4: TOTAL COSTS OF SOCIAL ASSISTANCE IN MILLIONS, BY 
SOURCE OVER TIME (2009-2018) 
 
Source: All data but HAP is sourced from Statistical Information on Social Welfare Services: 
Annual report 2018. HAP data taken from Kilkenny (2019) 
 
The second set of payments (Housing Allowance) cover expenses tied to 
heating, electricity, TV, and telephone related costs. Some of these 
payments apply universally to a specific population (retired respondents or 
those over the age of 65), while others apply to households on low incomes. 
The total costs tied to these payments appear steady since 2015 after a 
decline (2011-2015). Thinking of trends in general, there is a decline in 
government transfers tied to housing costs, at least in terms of the transfers 
considered here.  
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FIGURE 2.5: TOTAL NUMBER OF SCHEME BENEFICIARIES, FOCUSING ONLY 
ON HOUSING COST SCHEMES, OVER TIME (2009-2018). 
 
Source: All data but HAP is sourced from Statistical Information on Social Welfare Services: 
Annual report 2018. HAP data taken from Kilkenny (2019) 
 
Beyond total spending, Figure 2.5 shows that the total number of 
beneficiaries for Rent Supplements, Rent Allowance, and Mortgage Interest 
Supplements has fallen gradually since 2011. Most beneficiaries receive 
payments through the Rent Supplement scheme. The number of recipients 
has fallen since 2012, partly because of economic recovery and partly 
because of the Housing Assistance Payments scheme (see Table 2.0 
above) which launched in 2014 and became nationally available in 2017. 
The Mortgage Interest Supplement scheme closed to new applicants in 
January 2014 and ended in December 2017. However, even before then the 
number of beneficiaries had begun to fall, possibly due to Ireland’s economic 
recovery from 2012. Since the Rent Allowance scheme (discussed above) is 
tied to a specific group of tenants, the scheme’s beneficiaries are in double 
digits and declining every year. Thus, this scheme is focused on specific 
beneficiaries and cannot be expanded to the wider population.  
 
For reference, we include figures on HAP recipients from Kilkenny (2019). While 
these figures may not be directly comparable, they suggest that the HAP scheme is 



























FIGURE 2.6: AVERAGE ANNUAL PAYMENT PER BENEFICIARY (2009-2018) 
 
Source: Statistical Information on Social Welfare Services: Annual report 2018. Authors’ 
calculation, constant prices 
Note:  The Mortgage Interest Allowance scheme ended in 2017. 
 
Although the number of beneficiaries had declined since 2011, the average 
value given to a beneficiary appears to have risen since 2014 (Figure 2.6). 
This is especially true with the most popular benefit, Rent Supplement. This 
increase likely reflects the increased cost of housing, especially in the south-
eastern part of the country. The figures above are a rough estimate of 
average payments but could also reflect differences in the composition of 
beneficiaries, rather than any changes in maximum entitlements. For 
example, on Rent Supplement, more single parent households may have 
become reliant on the scheme during the years considered, which would 
change the costs associated with the “average tenant”, without noting a 
change in overall housing costs. 
 
2.2.1 A note on the Housing Assistance Payment 
scheme 
Part of the decline in funding for housing transfer can be explained by the 
launch of the HAP scheme, noted above. Statistics on the scheme do not 
feature in the Statistical Information on Social Welfare Services Annual 
Report, and so we briefly summarise the available data published by 



















Kilkenny (2019) shows that exchequer funding for the HAP scheme grew 
quickly from €0.5m in 2015 to €423m in 2019, which is on par with Rent 
Supplement spending for 2013 (Figure 2.4). Official outturn for the HAP 
scheme over the five years of implementation amounted to €503m. The 
scheme also saw an increase in tenancies from just 485 in 2014 to 43,443 in 
2018. This figure is on par with recipients of Rent Supplement in 2016 
(Figure 2.5). This quick growth suggests that a significant portion of the 
decline in Rent Supplement can be explained by the growth of the HAP 
scheme.  Future work should consider the impact of HAP on deprivation, 
which we were not able to do this here. 
 
TABLE 2.1: SUMMARY OF HOUSING ASSISTANCE PAYMENTS SCHEME 
(2014-2018) 
Year 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
      
Budget REV allocations 
in millions of € 
€0.5 €23.2 €47.7 €152.7 €301 
Out-turn (Appropriation 
Account) in millions of € 
€0.4 €15.6 €57.7 €152.7 €276.6 
Tenancies 485 6,165 16,493 31,228 43,443 
 
 
2.3 Housing Transfers and the Survey of Income 
and Living Conditions 
We now turn to housing-related transfers as they appear in the SILC dataset. 
We consider group differences in coverage, and the average amount 
received by social risk and social class groups. We also consider the 
average levels of deprivation for those receiving and those not receiving 
transfers, and their respective differences by social risk and social class. 
We first compare summary data as documented by the Department of Social 
Protection annual statistical report for 2018 to data in the SILC (Table 2.2.). 
Using survey weights, we find that roughly 50,000 people benefit from 
transfers related to housing, costing a total of €227 million, although this is 
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an estimate in the sample. Table 2.2 suggests that the SILC dataset may be 
overestimating the total number of recipients on one hand but 
underestimating the total cost of the transfers. However, generally the SILC 
data reflects the data reported by the DSP well. 
 
TABLE 2.2: CUMULATIVE COST OF RENT SUPPLEMENT, RENT ALLOWANCE, 
AND MORTGAGE SUPPLEMENT 





Affairs and Social 
Protection 2017 
Ireland Survey on 
Income and Living 
Conditions 2017 
(weighted) 
Beneficiaries 46,436 33,399  50,058 
Total €282.32 million € 235.21 million € 227.88 million 
 
We consider four key groups: those who receive housing supplements only, 
those who receive housing benefits only, and those who receive both 
housing supplements and housing benefits. In order to compare this group to 
a meaningful reference, we consider households who receive none of these 




FIGURE 2.7: PERCENTAGE OF HOUSEHOLDS RECEIVING TRANSFERS TIED 
TO HOUSING.  
 
Source:  SILC 2017. Authors’ Calculations  
Note:  Household level data, answered by head of household. 
Note:  SILC 2017 does not contain data on beneficiaries of HAP or those beneficiaries who 
have transferred from RS to HAP. 
 
Most households (56 per cent) do not receive any transfers tied to housing 
though they may receive other benefits or transfers. Just over one per cent 
of households receive only housing supplements such as assistance with 
rental payments or mortgage interest and do not receive transfers tied to 
electricity, TV, and heating. Just over 40 per cent of households receive 
housing benefits tied to electricity, TV, and heating without receiving 
supplements tied to larger housing costs. Many of these benefits are 
standard benefits tied to age, hence their higher coverage. Finally, just over 





















FIGURE 2.8: AVERAGE ANNUAL HOUSING TRANSFER BY TYPE OF 
TRANSFER.  
 
Source:  SILC 2017. Authors’ Calculations  
Note:  Household level data, answered by head of household. 
Note:  SILC 2017 does not contain data on beneficiaries of HAP or those beneficiaries who 
have transferred from RS to HAP. 
 
Figure 2.9 lists the mean and median sum received by each recipient type. 
Respondents who receive only housing supplements receive an average 
payment of €4,100+, or a median payment of €3,100+ for the entire year. 
Respondents who receive housing benefits only, receive an average 
payment of €560+, or a median payment of €580 for the entire year, which is 
substantially lower when compared to respondents who receive transfers 
tied to rental or mortgage interest costs. Respondents who received both 
housing supplements and housing benefits receive an average transfer of 
€5,700+, or a median payment of €4,900+ for the entire year. 
 
Those receiving housing supplements, and both housing supplements and 
housing benefits, are a minority. However, their annual housing transfers are 
significantly higher than the transfers receive by respondents in receipt of 
housing benefits only. We now turn to the social risk differences in access to 












Mean housing transfer € 0.00 € 4,100.56 € 561.01 € 5,719.33









Mean housing transfer Median housing transfer
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FIGURE 2.9: RECEIPT OF HOUSING TRANSFERS BY SOCIAL RISK.  
 
Source:  SILC 2017. Authors’ calculations  
Note:  Household level data, answered by head of household. 
Note:  SILC 2017 does not contain data on beneficiaries of HAP or those beneficiaries who 
have transferred from RS to HAP. 
 
Due to CSO limitations on cell size, we cannot explore social risk differences 
in the type of housing transfer received (as featured in Figure 2.1 for 
example). However, we can split social risk groups by whether they receive 
any housing transfer and the average value in such transfer (Figure 2.9). 
 
The most obvious finding is that older respondents are the most likely to 
receive a housing transfer in some form (respondents over 70 are entitled to 
the scheme, as outlined in the appendix of programme entitlements). This 
reflects the benefits and entitlements tied to retirement and old age, 
mentioned earlier. The remaining groups are less likely to receive a housing 
transfer when compared to older adults. Among lone parent households, 45 
per cent receive a housing transfer. Among households with a person with a 
disability, 45 per cent of households receive a housing transfer. In working 
age households (“other adults”, in the figures), where there are no lone 
parents or people with a disability, 31 per cent of households receive a 























FIGURE 2.10: AVERAGE ANNUAL TRANSFER BY SOCIAL RISK.  
 
Source:  SILC 2017. Authors’ calculations  
Note:  Household level data, answered by head of household. 
Note:  SILC 2017 does not contain data on beneficiaries of HAP or those beneficiaries who 
have transferred from RS to HAP. 
 
Lone parent households and households with a person with a disability 
receive higher mean housing transfers than other working-age households. 
Also, older households receive less on average than the two main social risk 
groups but more than the reference of other working-age households. We 
also note that in each group, there is a wide gap between the mean and the 
median, suggesting extreme values, most likely due to the high but rare 
instances of Rent Supplement. This discrepancy does not exist for older 
households suggesting these households receive more uniform payments 
(less Rent Supplement). 
 
Thinking only of households who receive transfers, we see that lone parents 
receive an average payment of €2,000+ per year, or a median of just €580+ 
per year. We also see that households with a person with a disability receive 
an average payment of €1,100+ per year, or a median payment on €585 per 
year. Other working-age households receive an average payment of €542, 
or a median payment of €100. Finally, older households receive an average 
payment of €800+ or a median payment of €680 for the entire year. We turn 









Mean transfer € 2,089.00 € 1,125.00 € 542.00 € 801.00
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FIGURE 2.11: ACCESS TO TRANSFERS BY SOCIAL CLASS (2017) 
 
Source:  SILC 2017. Authors’ calculations  
Note:  Household level data, answered by head of household. 
Note:  SILC 2017 does not contain data on beneficiaries of HAP or those beneficiaries who 
have transferred from RS to HAP. 
 
Respondents in the highest social class have the lowest access to housing 
transfers, although roughly 37 per cent of them receive such a transfer. The 
middle classes have more access to housing transfers (40 per cent); 
however, most do not receive housing transfers. Those in the lowest social 
class grouping have more access to housing transfers and most are entitled 
to some form of housing transfers. The group of unemployed or those who 
have never worked are the most likely to receive housing transfers (62 per 
cent). As before, the most vulnerable social groups are also most likely to 























FIGURE 2.12: AVERAGE ANNUAL TRANSFER BY SOCIAL CLASS (2017) 
 
Source:  SILC 2017. Authors’ calculations  
Note:  Household level data, answered by head of household. 
Note:  SILC 2017 does not contain data on beneficiaries of HAP or those beneficiaries who 
have transferred from RS to HAP. 
 
Thinking of group differences in transfer amount, members from the higher 
social class, who also receive a transfer, receive an average payment of 
€609, or a median payment of €100. Members from middle class groupings, 
who also receive a housing transfer, get an average payment of €665, or a 
median payment of €350. Members from the lowest social class grouping 
typically receive an average payment of €1,000+, or a median payment of 
€580. Finally, the unemployed or those who have never worked receive an 
average payment of €1,500+, or a median payment of €700+.  
 
Payments appear to increase steadily depending on the social class of 
members. As before, the sharp difference between mean and median 
payments suggests that there are higher values in the data for each class 
group. Again, this likely stems from the fact that housing benefits and 
housing allowances are conflated into one measure. 
 
Lastly, we compare the deprivation rate between those who receive housing 
transfers and those who do not receive them. We can further split these 
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qualify for housing transfers for several reasons which go beyond their social 
risk and social class. Thus, a lone parent household which does not qualify 
for a housing transfer may be an affluent household without significant 
housing costs (Callan and Keane, 2009). In the same way, lone-parent 
households who receive income transfers may also report a greater rate of 
deprivation than a lone-parent household that is not in need of social 
transfers, for reasons other than their status. However, given what we know 
about social risk groups, we would expect a greater rate of deprivation in 
such homes when compared to homes with other working-age adults who 
are not lone parents and who do not have a disability. 
 
FIGURE 2.13: DEPRIVATION RATE BY HOUSING TRANSFER RECEIPT AND   
SOCIAL RISK (2017)  
 
Source:  SILC 2017. Authors’ calculations  
Note:  Household level data, answered by head of household. The deprivation rate is the 
proportion of the group who experience enforced lack of 2 or more deprivation items.  
Note:  SILC 2017 does not contain data on beneficiaries of HAP or those beneficiaries who 
have transferred from RS to HAP. 
 
There are three general patterns in Figure 2.13. First and most importantly, 
recipients of social housing transfers in each social risk group report higher 
deprivation than those who are not in receipt of housing transfers. The 
difference is largest for lone parents who receive (54 per cent) and do not 
receive transfers (35 per cent), and households with a person with a 
Lone parent & Adult with adisability & Other adults &
Others over 65
years
Receiving 55.4% 50.1% 17.3% 10.7%


















disability where respondents receive (50 per cent) and do not receive 
transfers (28 per cent). However, even considering other working-age 
households, those receiving transfers are more likely to cite deprivation (17 
per cent) than households not in receipt of transfers (12 per cent), although 
the absolute rates for both groups are small.  
 
The second point is that social risk groups, such as lone parents and 
households with a person with a disability, have far higher levels of 
deprivation than other working age households, regardless of whether they 
receive transfers. In short, households in vulnerable social risk groups have 
higher absolute deprivation, than any other groups.  
 
Finally, households with older adults are the least likely to experience 
deprivation, and even households who receive housing transfers are often 
better off than households not in receipt of transfers. It is important to note 
that social-risk group membership cannot fully explain the need for social 
transfers tied to housing. Therefore, those receiving transfers obtain them 
because of eligibility criteria which go beyond social risk and social class. If 
they were not in receipt of such benefits, their rates may be higher still. As 
before, we can substitute social risk for social class, in trying to understand 







FIGURE 2.14: DEPRIVATION BY HOUSING TRANSFER RECEIPT AND SOCIAL 
CLASS  
 
Source: SILC 2017. Authors’ calculations  
Note:  Household level data, answered by head of household. The deprivation rate is the 
proportion of the group who experience enforced lack of 2 or more deprivation items 
Note:  SILC 2017 does not contain data on beneficiaries of HAP or those beneficiaries who 
have transferred from RS to HAP. 
 
Recipients of housing transfers report higher deprivation across all social 
classes. This gap is especially high among those in the unemployed or never 
worked group, where those receiving housing transfers report higher 
deprivation (52 per cent) than those not receiving transfers (32 per cent). 
The difference emerges again for the lowest social class groups who receive 
(35 per cent) and do not receive (29 percent) transfers. This difference is 
less pronounced among middle class groups who receive (19 per cent) and 
do not receive (17 per cent) transfers.  
 
Regardless of transfer receipt, members in the unemployed or never worked 
social class group are the most likely to report deprivation when compared to 
all other groups. Unlike social risk groups however, it appears that the most 
stable group (Highest social class) is largely unaffected by whether they 
receive housing transfers. As mentioned previously, higher rates of 
deprivation among respondents who receive housing transfers likely reflects 
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accuracy in social policy of targeting the population most in need of housing 
support.  
2.4 Deprivation levels with and without housing 
transfers 
In this section we will simulate the effects of housing transfers by predicting 
levels of deprivation with and without such transfers. Throughout, we will 
focus on the models discussed in the previous chapter. We re-estimate this 
model but subtract the value of housing transfers from households’ “log 
equivalised household income”. We then calculate the households’ predicted 
level of deprivation. In the second step, we add the value of housing 
transfers back into the equivalised household income measure and again 
calculate the households’ predicted probability of deprivation. We subtract 
the difference of these two predicted probabilities and present the results. 
Before considering the effect of the transfer, we first show the absolute rate 
of deprivation in Figure 2.15. 
 
FIGURE 2.15: PREDICTED PROBABILITY OF EXPERIENCING EACH LEVEL OF 
DEPRIVATION (%).  
 
Source: SILC 2017. Authors’ Calculations  
Note:  The chart contains predicted probabilities taken from model 3 in Table 1.1. The 
model controls for social risk, social class, characteristics of the head of the household and 
equivalised household income. Household income contains all forms of income except the 
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Most respondents do not report any deprivation (63 per cent), a smaller 
portion cite just one item out of 11 (14 per cent). For the overall population, 
absolute levels of deprivation are significant. We now turn to the effect of 
housing transfers for those who receive them. 
 
FIGURE 2.16: CHANGE IN DEPRIVATION AFTER HOUSING TRANSFERS ARE 
INCLUDED INTO TOTAL HOUSEHOLD INCOME.  
 
Source: SILC 2017. Authors’ calculations  
Note:  The chart contains predicted probabilities taken from model 3. The model controls 
for social risk, social class, characteristics of the head of the household and equivalised 
household income.  
 
Figure 2.16 captures the difference in deprivation after housing transfers are 
added to the model. The results are minor, but they suggest that housing 
transfers increase the odds of experiencing no deprivation by 1.48 
percentage points. If we consider the binary definition of deprivation (two or 
more items) we see that transfers lower the predicted probability of citing 
deprivation by almost 2 per cent. These differences are drawn from 
respondents in the middle of the deprivation distribution, which sees a 
decline after the transfers are included. The results, however, focus on 
people overall, whereas it is likely that social risk and social class differences 
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2.4.1 Social risk differences in deprivation and 
transfers 
We now consider specific social risk groups and their experience with 
deprivation and transfers. Firstly, we note the absolute rates of deprivation, 
after controlling for the measures outlined in Model 3 in Table 1.1.  
 
FIGURE 2.17: PREDICTED PROBABILITY OF EXPERIENCING EACH LEVEL OF 
DEPRIVATION BY SOCIAL RISK.  
 
Source: SILC 2017. Authors’ calculations  
Note:  The chart contains predicted probabilities taken from model 3. The model controls 
for social risk, social class, characteristics of the head of the household and equivalised 
household income. 
 
Figure 2.17 shows that deprivation (instances where a household cannot 
afford two or more items on the list of deprivation items) was the least 
common among adults over 65 years of age (Over 65) and other working 
age adults (Other adults). Regarding Other adults, our model predicts that 
they have an over 70 per cent chance of citing no deprivation items (not 
having a morning, afternoon or evening out once a fortnight, or not having a 
meal with meat, chicken, fish (or vegetarian equivalent) every second day, 
etc.). Adults over 65 also have an over 70 per cent chance of citing no 
deprivation items. Lone parents and people in households where someone 






















Number of deprivation items
Lone Parents Disabilities Working age respondents Respondents over 65
 
Page 72 
and higher predicted probabilities of citing multiple deprivation counts (over 
50 per cent). Most other working-age adults and older adults have either no 
deprivation or lack just one deprivation item. Most lone parents and people in 
households with a person with a disability lack two or more items of 
deprivation. We now consider the effects of housing transfers on deprivation. 
 
FIGURE 2.18: CHANGE IN DEPRIVATION AFTER HOUSING TRANSFERS BY 
SOCIAL RISK.  
 
Source: SILC 2017. Authors’ calculations  
Note:  The chart contains predicted probabilities taken from model 3. The model controls 
for social risk, social class, characteristics of the head of the household and equivalised 
household income. 
 
Thinking of the binary outcome, the greatest change in deprivation occurs for 
lone parents (-5 percentage points in the chance of lacking two deprivation 
items) and those with a disability (-3 percentage points in the chances of 
lacking two deprivation items). A lesser effect is found among working-age 
adults and adults over 65. Some of these results reflect the low levels of 
absolute deprivation noted earlier. For example, other working-age adults 
are unlikely to be deprived in absolute terms (Figure 2.17), and therefore 
housing transfers (if any received) likely have a lower impact when 
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2.4.2 Social class differences in deprivation and 
transfers 
We now turn to social class differences in absolute deprivation and their 
experience with housing transfers. As before, we first consider the absolute 
rates of deprivation, after controlling for the measures discussed in the 
previous chapter. 
 
FIGURE 2.19: PREDICTED PROBABILITY OF EXPERIENCING EACH LEVEL OF 
DEPRIVATION BY SOCIAL CLASS  
 
Source: SILC 2017. Authors’ calculations  
Note:  The chart contains predicted probabilities taken from model 3. The model controls 
for social risk, social class, characteristics of the head of the household and equivalised 
household income. 
 
There is a strong difference between the highest social class and each 
subsequent class (Figure 2.19). The probability of listing deprivation 
gradually increases across social classes. Those in the unemployed/never 
worked class, for example, have a less than 40 per cent chance of listing no 
deprivation items, while those in the highest social class group have a 
predicted probability of over 70 per cent of listing no deprivation items. 
Further, those in the lower group and the unemployed/never worked social 
class group are the most likely to cite additional items of deprivation. We 
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groups (Figure 2.20). 
 
FIGURE 2.20: CHANGE IN DEPRIVATION AFTER HOUSING TRANSFERS BY 
SOCIAL CLASS.  
 
Source: SILC 2017. Authors’ calculations  
Note:  The chart contains predicted probabilities taken from model 3. The model controls 
for social risk, social class, characteristics of the head of the household and equivalised 
household income. 
 
The graph is now the inverse of the predicted probability of deprivation. The 
effect of housing transfers is most pronounced among the unemployed/never 
worked group who see more than a three-percentage point increase in their 
chances of reporting no deprivation items. The intermediate group also sees 
some return to housing transfers, as does the highest social class, although 
these are far smaller effects. Housing transfers for the unemployed/never 
worked group also increase their chances of lacking just one or two items of 
deprivation, rather than several. 
 
The effects of transfers are on par with simulations carried out by Notten 
(2019), who considered Ireland overall but did not split these effects by 
social risk and social class groups. We also note that the effect of transfers 
is positive in that they lower deprivation levels, and that vulnerable social risk 
groups like lone parents, those living in households where a person has a 
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transfers. In terms of class, we note that vulnerable social classes, such as 
the unemployed and the lowest social class, benefit the most from housing 
transfers, compared to other social classes. 
 
2.5 Summary 
This chapter explored the importance of housing transfers and simulated 
their effects on deprivation. Ireland has experienced a compositional change 
in its housing market, with a growing reliance on private rental, and a fall in 
home ownership. Within the housing market there has been an increase in 
cost, most notably the cost of rent, but also in the cost of home ownership. 
This change has led to pressure on families, especially those of vulnerable 
social risk and social class groups. Support and transfers tied to housing 
costs have declined in recent years, especially in terms of support tied 
explicitly to rental and mortgage interest costs, although we note more 
recent schemes such as Housing Assistance Payments have emerged to fill 
the gap in the private rental sector. Although our data captures household 
who may have received HAP, we are not able to explicitly isolate households 
who receive this payment.  
 
With these changes in mind, we explored the prevalence and effect of 
housing transfers in the Irish SILC data. We found that most recipients of 
housing transfers received relatively small benefits that were tied to energy 
and other housing costs. Few recipients received support tied to the more 
substantial rent or mortgage interest costs, and fewer still received both 
types of support. The average level of transfers differed greatly, depending 
on the type of support received. Due to CSO data limitations we were not 
able to explore these differences by social risk and social class, instead we 
opted to consider all housing supports together as one category.  
 
Older recipients are the most likely to receive housing transfers with over 70 
per cent of this group receiving some type of housing support. Part of this 
effect stems from the automatic entitlement to housing supports tied to 
retirement and old age pensions, such as various fuel allowances and 
television licence fees. Other working-age adults were the least reliant on 
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housing transfers, just over 30 per cent of them collected some form of 
transfer. People living in households with a person with a disability and lone 
parents sat at the national average, just over 44 per cent of them received 
housing transfers of some kind. Regarding the average transfer, lone 
parents received the highest average payments (over €2,000 for the year), 
most likely because they were reliant on transfers to fund housing in the 
private rental market. People living in households with a person with a 
disability (over €1,000 for the year) and older people (over €800 for the year) 
received less on average, possibly because they were less reliant on 
transfers tied to explicit housing costs and more reliant on energy transfers 
such as heating and electricity. Other working-age adults received the lowest 
amounts on average, just over €100 for the year. The results change when 
we consider the median transfer, with groups receiving largely uniform 
payments of just over €500 for the entire year.  
 
Regarding social class, we found that the highest social class groups relied 
little on transfers (37 per cent), but that subsequent groups were gradually 
more reliant, from middle social class (40 per cent), to the lowest social class 
(53 per cent), to the unemployed/never worked (62 per cent). These groups 
became progressively more likely to receive housing benefits, most likely 
due to limited resources. The average transfer was also lowest among the 
highest social class group (€609 for the year) and became progressively 
higher for each subsequent group, from the middle social class (€665 for the 
year), to the lowest social class (€1,000 for the year), and the 
unemployed/never worked (€1,500 for the year). 
 
We noted that deprivation was highest among those receiving housing 
transfers. Thus, deprived households have a greater chance of receiving 
transfers compared to those who are not deprived. We also found that levels 
of deprivation among older and other working age groups were lower than 
lone parents and people living in households with a person with a disability 
regardless of whether they received housing transfers or not. We reported a 
similar finding among social class groups, with each group reporting higher 
deprivation if they received housing transfers. Further lowest social class 
and unemployed/never worked groups contained higher levels of deprivation 
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than the Highest and Middle social class groups regardless of whether they 
received housing transfers or not.  
 
Lastly, we simulated the effects of housing transfers on deprivation. 
Transfers reduce deprivation and furthermore, vulnerable groups, such as 
lone parents and people living with a person with a disability, report the 
highest benefit from housing transfers when compared to other working-age 
adults. Respondents who are unemployed/never worked or those who are in 











3.1 Primary care reimbursement service and general 
medical services 
In Ireland, the Health and Service Executive (HSE) is responsible for the 
provision of public health resources through hospitals, health care centres, 
community centres, and social care services. Access to health services, 
including GP visits, relies on payment. However, access to medical services 
(such as GP visits, drugs and surgery) may be provided free of charge 
through the General Medical Services (GMS) scheme. Card holders are 
exempt from certain payments described below. 
 
Eligibility for medical cards is means tested based on income, with some 
applicants eligible due to poor health conditions. Eligibility for GP visit cards 
is also means tested, however, respondents aged 70 and above are 
automatically eligible and drawn into the scheme, as well as children aged 
under six. These beneficiaries do not have to pay fees to see a GP but do 
have to pay for other medical services or medicines. In 2017, an estimated 
43.8 per cent of the population was covered under the GMS scheme, either 
via a medical card (33.6 per cent) or a GP visit card (10.2 per cent). For 
people not meeting the means test for a medical card or a GP visit card, they 
might still be eligible if such refusal has for consequence that they (or their 
dependents) have “undue hardship” or it is “unduly burdensome” to get GP 
services from their own resources.18 The medical card covers a wide range 
of medical services such as free GP, public out-patient and in-patient 
services, prescribed drugs and medicines, dental, optical, aural services and 
maternity services. GP visit card covers GP visits but it does not cover 
hospital charges and prescribed drugs (unless covered by the Drug Payment 
Scheme). 
 
3.1.1 Medical card 
The Primary Care Reimbursement Service (PCRS) is responsible for 
payments to medical professionals who provide free or reduced-cost medical 
 
                                                             
 
18 The assessment of hardship looks at the applicant and their family’s ability to meet basic costs such as 
decent housing, provision of heating, food and clothing. 
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services to the public. The PCRS provides annual statistics about the 
number of people in receipt of medical cards by gender and age; we list 
these in Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2. We show two time-periods in the figures 
to highlight the change in age composition of recipients over time. 
 
Figure 3.1 shows the absolute number of people in receipt of medical cards, 
while Figure 3.2 expresses these recipients as a percentage of the age 
group. Medical cards are least common among respondents aged 15-24. 
They are most common among respondents aged 65 and over but also 
among those aged 0-14. Comparing the two time-periods outlined below, the 
overall number of people in receipt of a medical card fell from just over 
1,694,000 in 2011 to almost 1,610,000 in 2017. The number of recipients 
has been relatively stable between time points. The largest fall took place for 
the 25-34 and 0-14 age groups. There has been no corresponding increase 
in medical card holders among older groups. 
 
FIGURE 3.1: NUMBER OF PEOPLE IN RECEIPT OF MEDICAL CARD BY AGE 
GROUP, (2011-2017) 
 
Source: HSE statistics. Authors’ Calculations  
 
Splitting the CSO population estimates by age, we show the rate of medical 
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card use for each age group. There was a reduction in the percentage of 
people eligible for a medical card going from 37 per cent in 2011 to 34 per 
cent in 2017 overall.19 Generally, the age distribution of medical cards has a 
U-shape with younger and older people being more likely to qualify for the 
cards, compared to working-age adults. However, there are also substantial 
differences between younger and older respondents, with lower levels of 
receipt among the young. 
 
Looking at the medical card rate, we see there was a minor reduction between time 
points for almost all people, except those aged 45-54. One possible explanation 
could be the relative reduction of people satisfying the means test criteria, as 
household income increased during the recovery and fewer people were in receipt of 
welfare benefits with entitlements to a medical card. This reduction was more 
pronounced for the two older age groups than for the younger age groups. Among 
older people (aged 75+), medical card receipt fell 14 percentage points between 
2011 and 2017.  
 
The fall in receipt of medical card among the 75+ group is due to people not 
satisfying the means test for medical card and to a change over time in the 
income limits for the means test. The initial income limits to qualify for a 
medical card for people aged 70+ in 2011 were a gross weekly income of 
€700 for a single person and €1,400 for a couple. These limits were reduced 
to €600 and €1,200 respectively with the Budget 2013 and to €500 and €900 
with the Budget 2014 up to 2019. As a consequence there has been an 
increase in the percentage of receipt of GP visit card among this age group 
as can be seen in Figure 3.4. 
 
                                                             
 
19 CSO and the HSE use different age group classification for the younger population, the best possible 
aggregation was to group all children under the age of 14. The classification is identical between the two data 
sources for all the other age groups.  
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FIGURE 3.2: PERCENTAGE OF ELIGIBLE PERSONS IN RECEIPT OF MEDICAL 
CARD BY AGE GROUP (2011-2017) 
 
Source: HSE Statistics 
Note:  Authors’ calculations based on CSO population estimates from databank and HSE.  
 
3.1.2 GP visit card 
The PCRS also holds annual statistics on the number of persons in receipt 
of GP visit cards. Figure 3.3 lists these figures, split by age and year, as 
before.  
 
There is a sharp difference between years of data collection. In 2011, few 
GP cards were issued and people aged 70 and over did not hold them.20 
The age group most likely to receive a GP card in both years was working-
age adults (35-44). In 2017, GP cards were most prevalent among children 
aged 14 and under (250,000+ cards), older people had the least amount of 
access to GP cards, especially those aged 55 to 64 (11,300+ cards). People 
aged 70 and over also became eligible for the cards. Comparing GP cards 
and medical cards across all age groups, we found that there are far fewer 
 
                                                             
 
20 They either did not qualify for a GP card or qualified for a medical card.  
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people in receipt of a GP visit card than a medical card. The sharp rise in 
older and younger GP visit card users stemmed from a reform by the 
Department of Health, which gave GP visit cards to all children aged under 
six and to all people aged 70+ regardless of income, starting from August 
2015. The increase in GP visit card among those aged 70+ was also due to 
an increase in the number of people not satisfying the means test for a 
medical card (see medical card section above for further details)  
 
FIGURE 3.3: NUMBER OF ELIGIBLE PERSONS IN RECEIPT OF GP CARD BY 
AGE GROUP, 2011-2017 
 
Source: HSE Statistics 
 
Figure 3.4 considers the likelihood of holding a GP card by age group, as 
before. It shows that GP visit cards were generally uncommon in 2011 (3 per 
cent), but quickly became more widespread (10 per cent) by 2017. However, 
the main driver of this change is the distribution of GP cards to children 
(aged 0 to 14) and older adults (aged 70 and over). Looking at the rate of 
card holders to non-card holders, the change between 2011 and 2017 was 




FIGURE 3.4: PERCENTAGE OF ELIGIBLE PERSONS IN RECEIPT OF GP VISIT 
CARD BY AGE GROUP (2011-2017) 
 
Source: HSE Statistics 
Note:  Author calculations based on CSO population estimates from databank and HSE.  
 
Finally, in Figure 3.5 we report the total extent of coverage of the medical 
card and GP visit card drawn from the results presented in Figure 3.4 and 
Figure 3.2. The overall distribution of access to the medical card and GP visit 
card takes the form of a U-shape across age groups. Combining both cards, 
the level of coverage for the population goes from a total of 23 per cent in 
2017 for the age group 25-34 to a high of 100 per cent in both years for 
people aged 75 and over. As seen in the previous charts, by far the access 
to the medical card is the dominant form of medical cover but less so in 2017 
for the age group 0-14 and 70-74.  
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FIGURE 3.5: PERCENTAGE OF ELIGIBLE PERSONS IN RECEIPT OF MEDICAL 
CARD AND GP VISIT CARD BY AGE GROUP, (2011-2017) 
 
Source: HSE Statistics 
Note:  Author calculations based on CSO population estimates from databank and HSE.  
 
3.1.3 Cost of medical cards and GP visit cards 
The PCRS also provides annual statistics on the total cost of medical 
services provided to the public. Two of its largest components are the costs 
of prescribed drugs and costs tied to medical card and GP card holders. In 
2017 the total GMS expenditure on medical card holders and primary care 
schemes was €2.75 billion. The largest expenditure was for the payment to 
pharmacists for €989 million, followed by €552 million in payments to GPs 
for services provided to medical card and GP visit card holders. 
 
3.1.4 Comparing HSE and SILC data 
In this section we compare data from the Irish SILC to HSE statistics. 
Specifically, we look at the percentage of medical card and GP visit card 
holders across age groups in both datasets. Figure 3.6 shows a similar U-
shaped pattern in the relationship between medical cards and age. Although 
there is a slight overestimation in the SILC data for those under the age of 
70, both sets of statistics are quite similar, suggesting they capture a similar 
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FIGURE 3.6: PERCENTAGE OF PERSONS IN RECEIPT OF MEDICAL CARD BY 
AGE GROUP, HSE AND SILC 2017 
 
Source: HSE Statistics & SILC 2017 
 
Figure 3.7 recreates this plot with the GP visit cards in mind. It shows that 
despite the exception of younger and older age groups, the percentage of 
recipients of a GP visit card within age groups is almost identical. However, 
at both extremes the SILC data tends to underestimate the percentage of 
recipients compared to the HSE data. This is especially true among younger 
recipients. These differences could to be related to the fact that while 
members from both age groups (up to the age of six for the 0-14 group) are 
entitled to the GP visit card (unless they have a medical card), respondents 
do not report holding the GP visit card (on behalf of children under six) or for 
themselves. Moreover, as noted in Chapter 2, some of the differences 
















FIGURE 3.7: PERCENTAGE OF PERSONS IN RECEIPT OF GP VISIT CARD BY 
AGE GROUP, HSE AND SILC 2017 
 
Source: HSE Statistics and SILC 2017 
 
3.2 Medical and GP visit cards across social risk 
groups 
We now turn to the SILC dataset to learn more about who receives and uses 
these transfers. We are especially interested in social risk differences 
regarding access to these cards. Social risk-groups are particularly important 
because they are limited in the extent to which they can engage with the 
labour market (Privalko et al., 2019). Access to medical and GP visit cards is 
means-tested with the applicants’ income and economic status in mind. 
However, it is universal for those above a specific age in retirement and is 
sometimes granted to other groups (like those with certain disabilities) 
because of discretionary evaluations of an applicant’s circumstances. For 
example, the most vulnerable groups of the population are more likely to 
receive these transfers, even when means-tested benchmarks such as 
income thresholds are not met. 
 
Figure 3.8 shows the distribution of medical cards overall and by social risk 
group. There are two important patterns in this figure. First, most 













cent). Just 37 per cent have a medical card and just four per cent have a GP 
visit card, which is the least common health-related transfer. Second, among 
vulnerable social risk groups (lone parents, adults with a disability, and 
adults aged 65 and over) respondents with a medical card are more 
common than respondents who either have a GP visit card or neither card. 
This is not the case among other working age adults (Other adults), where it 
is more common to have neither benefit. 
 
FIGURE 3.8: PERCENTAGE OF PERSONS AGED 16 AND OVER IN RECEIPT OF 
MEDICAL CARD OR GP VISIT CARD BY SOCIAL RISK AND 
GROUPS  
 
Source: SILC 2017. Authors’ calculations 
Note: * indicates the cell size was too small to report the statistic (CSO guidelines).  
 
Focusing only on children aged less than 16, a slightly different pattern 
emerges (Figure 3.9).21 Again, there are two noteworthy results. First, over 
half of children under 16 have either a medical card or a GP visit card. 
Second, as before, children in lone-parent households and households with 
a disability are more likely to receive a medical card than they are to receive 
neither card. However, children from households with other working-age 
 
                                                             
 
21 During the interviews, respondents were asked if children up to the age of 16 were covered by a medical 



















Other over 65 Total
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adults (other children) are more likely to not be in receipt of a card compared 
to receiving a medical card or a GP card.  
 
FIGURE 3.9: PERCENTAGE OF CHILDREN AGED LESS THAN 16 IN RECEIPT 
OF MEDICAL CARD OR GP VISIT CARD BY SOCIAL RISK 
GROUPS 
 
Source: SILC 2017. Authors’ calculations 
Note: * indicates the cell size was too small to report the statistic (CSO guidelines).  
 
3.3 Medical and GP visit cards across social class 
groups 
We can also consider the differences above in terms of social class, using 
the categories discussed in Chapter 1. As before, we are particularly 
interested in differences between social class groups in terms of who gets 
access to transfers and who does not. Again, it is important to note that 
social class does not fully explain access to medical and GP visit cards, but 
we expect some correlation between disadvantaged class categories and 
access to the transfer.  
 
Figure 3.10 shows a clear and gradient pattern between social class and 
access to medical cards or GP visit cards. First, the highest and intermediate 





















Child of lone parent Child of adult with
disability
Other children Total
Yes, Medical card Yes, GP visit card Neither
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likely not to receive either card, than to receive a medical card or a GP visit 
card. Second, the lowest social class group and the unemployed are unique 
in that most respondents in this group receive a medical card. Those who do 
not receive a card are in the minority. Third, the level of receipt of medical 
card increases gradually from 20 per cent, for higher and lower professional, 
to reach 63 per cent, for the lower or unskilled manual classes, and a high of 
70 per cent for the unemployed class or those who have never worked.  
 
FIGURE 3.10: PERCENTAGE OF PERSONS AGED 16 AND OVER IN RECEIPT 
OF MEDICAL CARD OR GP VISIT CARD BY SOCIAL CLASS 
GROUPS 
 
Source: SILC 2017. Authors’ calculations 
Note: * indicates the cell size was too small to report the statistic (CSO guidelines).  
 
As before, we turn our attention only to children aged 16 and under. The 
class differences in access to medical and GP visit cards remains largely the 
same, although the differences between classes are somewhat more 
extreme. Seventy-one per cent of children from the lower-class groups and 
97 per cent of children from unemployed class groups receive a medical 
card. The universal delivery of a GP visit card for children under the age of 
six explains the higher level of receipt of this cover across all social class 
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FIGURE 3.11: PERCENTAGE OF CHILDREN AGED LESS THAN 16 IN RECEIPT 
OF MEDICAL CARD OR GP VISIT CARD BY SOCIAL CLASS 
GROUPS 
 
Source: SILC 2017. Authors’ calculations 
Note: * indicates the cell size was too small to report the statistic (CSO guidelines).  
 
3.4 Poverty, medical card and GP visit card 
We have shown several differences in access to medical and GP card by 
social risk and social class group. Means-testing ensures that low income 
households (those most exposed to poverty, deprivation and social 
exclusion) are most likely to receive a medical card or a GP visit card 
(Keilthy, 2009; Russell and Nolan 2000). However, even with these groups, 
a substantial portion of households do not gain access to these resources 
(Keilthy, 2009; Layte et al., 2007). 
 
We now explore the relationship between people’s risk of poverty and social 
exclusion and whether they hold a medical card and GP visit card. Figure 
3.12 breaks down access to medical and GP cards by deprivation and 
poverty; we consider three poverty measures, the at-risk of poverty, basic 
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First, access to medical cards for the income poor and those in deprivation 
are almost identical. Over two-thirds of those that are income poor or 
deprived are in receipt of a medical card. However, very few respondents in 
this group hold a GP visit card. This pattern stands opposite to their 
respective reference categories, non-income poor and non-deprived.  
 
Second, access to medical cards is most pronounced among those who are 
consistently poor. Almost nine out of ten respondents are in receipt of a 
medical card for this category. These results confirm our previous findings; 
medical cards target the most vulnerable group and most disadvantaged 
groups.  
 
FIGURE 3.12: PERCENTAGE OF PEOPLE IN RECEIPT OF A MEDICAL OR GP 
VISIT CARD BY POVERTY OUTCOMES  
 
Source: SILC 2017. Authors’ calculations 
Note: * indicates the cell size was too small to report the statistic (CSO guidelines).  
 
As a final confirmation of this point, we can again turn our focus only to 
children under the age of 16. Figure 3.13 splits access to medical cards by 
poverty measures. As before, in each measure of poverty and deprivation 
we find greater access to medical card and GP card transfers. Thus, the 
income poor, the deprived, and the consistently poor have greater access to 
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children at risk of poverty and 94 per cent of those in consistent poverty have 
access to a medical card. Again, the figure shows that medical cards and GP 
cards are well targeted in that they provide strong cover for those in 
deprivation and poverty.  
 
FIGURE 3.13: PERCENTAGE OF CHILDREN AGED LESS THAN 16 IN RECEIPT 
OF MEDICAL CARD OR GP VISIT CARD BY POVERTY OUTCOMES 
 
Source: SILC 2017. Authors’ calculations 
Note: * indicates the cell size was too small to report the statistic (CSO guidelines).  
 
3.5 Estimating the monetary value of medical and 
GP visit cards 
In Chapter 1 we described the complexity and challenges of attaching a 
monetary value to non-cash benefits. There are different approaches to 
estimating the value of a service, especially one that is provided free or at a 
reduced fee. One is a simple accounting approach (or objective), where the 
cost of the services provision is attached to the service itself. A second 
approach (subjective and more difficult) is to ask people to value access to 
the service themselves, although this will lead to extensively different 
estimates from people, depending on their characteristics, circumstances, 
and preferences (Smeeding, 1982). In the Irish context, we follow Keane and 
Bercholz (2019), to briefly describe some of the main approaches found in 




























• The cost per capita method consists in estimating the average value 
of a service by dividing the total expenditure of the service by the 
number of people in receipt of the service.  
• The usage method consists in looking at an individual’s health 
consumption across all health services, such as the number of GP 
visits, dental treatment, use of in-patient services as well as 
medicines.  
• The market value of a benefit-in-kind corresponds to the amount of 
spending that a person would have to pay on the market if they 
wanted to avail of this service. In the case of a medical card or GP 
visit card, the closest estimate would correspond to the price a 
consumer would have to pay on the private health insurance market 
to get the same level of provision of services. Depending on people’s 
characteristics and the supply and demand for such services, there 
might be some large variation in terms of price, as well as the level 
of medical cover offered on the health insurance market. This makes 
it difficult to estimate. Moreover, in Ireland, private health insurances 
cover mainly in-patient services, excluding services such as the cost 
of GP visits, dental care and medicines, for example.  
• The risk-related method is based on the cost per capita but rather 
than applying the same average value to everyone irrespective of 
some of their characteristics, they receive a value corresponding to 
the average expenditure corresponding to the usage based on their 
gender and age group. This is the method we use in this chapter for 
the valuation of the medical card and GP visit card. This method has 
been used in Ireland for the valuation of medical cards (Savage et 
al., 2016; Russell and Nolan 2000) as well as internationally 
(Saunders et al.,1992; Donaldson et al., 2002).  
 
The brief description above of some of the methods to estimate values to 
non-cash benefits highlights their respective merits and limits and very often 
the preferred method will also be driven by the availability and quality of the 
data needed to produce these estimates. In the Irish context of valuation of 
medical services such as the medical card and GP visit card and based on 
 
Page 95 
the data available to us, the preferred method is the risk-related approach. 
 
3.5.1 Risk-related approach 
We used two data sources to estimate the monetary value of medical and 
GP visit cards: the SILC micro-data and the annual statistics from the 
Primary Care Reimbursement Service (PCRS) publication. The PCRS report 
lists three important costs tied to our estimate; the cost of a night spent in 
hospital, the cost of a GP visit, and the cost of medicines. These costs are 
split by medical card users, GP card users, and costs for the general 
population. They are also split by 11 age groups (starting from 0 to 5 years 
and ending with people aged 75 and over) and also by gender. Based on 
these aggregated costs and age breakdowns, we can create the estimated 
value of both cards. 
 
3.5.2 Hospital cost 
The SILC data collects information about the number of nights that adults 
and children respectively have spent in a hospital in the12 months prior to 
the interview. Based on this information we get the annual average number 
of nights by age group, going from 1.16 nights for the younger age group to 
2.35 nights for the older group. The service charge for an inpatient at the 
hospital is €80 per day up to a maximum amount of €800 over a 12-month 
period, if the person has several hospital admissions. As medical card 
holders do not have to pay this service charge, the estimated value of 
hospital stays for a medical card holder is the service charge of €80 
multiplied by the average number of nights of their respective age group. 
The hospital cost goes from a low annual average of €36 for the five to 15 
years olds to €188 for people aged 65 and over. 
 
3.5.3 Medical card, GP visit card and medicine cost 
The estimate for the value of a medical card and GP visit card is based on 
the PCRS annual expenditure statistics (2017). In 2017, the total payments 
to GPs for the provision of services to medical card and GP visit card holders 
was €522,374,936 and the number of medical card and GP visit card holders 
was 2,097,330. The annual average in 2017 was therefore €249.07 per 
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capita. GPs under the GMS scheme receive annual capitation fees based on 
their number of patients holding medical card and GP visit cards. While 
these fees take account of age and gender differences in the likelihood for 
healthcare, it is quite likely that the real cost could be underestimated or 
overestimated as it will vary with the extent to which patients use health 
services.  
 
Using the same methodology as Russell and Nolan (2000), we estimated the 
usage by medical card and GP visit card holders for GP services and 
medicines for each age group, by using a weight based on their respective 
average cost of medicines as provided by the PCRS annual statistics. For 
example, in 2017, the average cost of medicines for children aged under five 
years was €85.18, and for the total population of medical card holders it was 
€614.87. So, the average cost for medicines for children under the age of 
five is 0.14 times (€85.18/€614.87), the annual average one. We then used 
this weight of 0.14 and multiplied it by €249.07 (annual average medical card 
and GP visit card cost), giving an annual average of €35. These results for 
all the age groups are presented in column 4 of Table 3.4, showing an 
increasing average cost of medical cards and GP visit cards with age 
reaching a high of €534 for people aged 65 and over. The cost of medicines 
is also based on the same weights for each age group.  
 
Table 3.4 summarises the measures mentioned above. The final column 
shows the estimated total cost of hospital stays, GP visit of medicines for GP 
and visit card holders. The estimate varies from €149 per year for children 













TABLE 3.4: ANNUAL MEDICAL COST VALUATION PER USER, BY AGE 
GROUP, 2017 
Age group Ratio of mean 
number of nights 
at the hospital to 
the total average 
number of nights 












Under 5 1.16 €93 €35 €78 €206 
5-15 years  0.45 €36 €35 €79 €149 
16-44 years  0.74 €59 €114 €258 €431 
45-64 years  0.97 €77 €283 €642 €1,003 
65 years + 2.35 €188 €534 €1,213 €1,936 
Total 1 €80 €249 €566 €815 
 
Source: Primary care reimbursement services, 2017  
 
In comparison with the 2015 medical costs by Savage at al. (2016), Table 
3.4 shows a broad pattern of an increase in hospital costs for the younger 
and older age groups due to an increase in the average number of hospital 
nights; a reduction in GP cost for the former but an increase for the latter, 
and finally an overall reduction in the cost of medicines across age groups. 
Using this table, we can create an estimated monetary value for medical and 
GP cards. This would give us a value for the transfer which we could then 










TABLE 3.5: MEAN ANNUAL EQUIVALENT MEDICAL CARD AND GP VISIT 
CARD SUBSIDIES BY SOCIAL RISK AND SOCIAL CLASS OVER 
HOUSEHOLDS 
Groups Mean annual subsidy 
Social risk  
Lone parent and children €1,010 
Adult with a disability and children €1,392 
Other adults and children €1,027 
Other over 65 €2,046 
  
Social class  
High & lower professional €1,143 
Inter/tech/self-employed €1,260 







Source: SILC 2017. Authors’ own calculations  
Note: * We are unable to list values for households with a disability and households who 
are unemployed due to CSO rules about the minimum number of cases required. However, 
because in the modelling simulation below we use equivalised household income across all 
individuals we have enough cases to use the values that are not shown in Table 3.5.  
 
3.6 Multivariate analysis of medical cards and GP 
visit cards on material deprivation 
In Chapter 1 we presented the ordered logistic regression model to predict 
the level of deprivation across social risk and social class groups. This 
section uses the same methodology as in Chapter 2 to predict deprivation 
with a score ranging from 0 items (no deprivation) to a maximum of 11 items 
(deprived on all items) controlling for a range of individual and household 
socio-economic characteristics. We predict group differences in the 
probability of citing each item of deprivation from 0 (not deprived) to 11 
(deprived on all items) for people holding a medical card/GP visit card. The 
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analysis below is done only for people stating that they hold a medical card 
or a GP card, so we are not including non-take-up as this would require a 
different simulation exercise. It is quite likely that including non-take-up 
would increase the effect of health support on deprivation as noted by Callan 
et al. (2018a); there is an under-representation of people in the bottom 
income distribution holding a medical card or a GP visit card and their 
entitlement.  
 
Figure 3.13 first considers group differences in social risk groups. There are 
significant differences here in the absolute risk of deprivation. Lone parent 
households with a medical card or GP visit card have a predicted probability 
of 0.31 of experiencing no deprivation. Households over 65 have a far higher 
predicted probability of citing no deprivation at 0.82. Other working-age 
households, (labelled other adults), with a medical card or GP visit card have 
a predicted probability of 0.66, which sits between these estimates. 
 
People living in lone parent households as well as those living in a 
household with a person with a disability are the most exposed to experience 
deprivation across all levels of deprivation, even if the risk decreases as the 
number of items increases. While older households with medical card or GP 
visit cards report low predicted probabilities of citing more than three 
deprivation items, it is only from seven items onwards that it becomes rarer 
for lone parents and people in a household with a person with a disability.  
 
At the right side of Figure 3.14 we show the predicted probability of 
experiencing basic deprivation (lacking at least two items) across the same 
groups with a medical card or GP visit card. The risk is very high for lone 
parents and people in a household with a person with a disability at 0.49 and 
0.45 respectively, while it is less than half that for working age adults (other 
adults) at 0.19 and less than 0.10 for respondents over 65.  
 
This pattern mirrors the general pattern across the overall population where 
the level of basic deprivation is the lowest for people aged 65 and over, while 




FIGURE 3.14: PREDICTED PROBABILITIES OF DEPRIVATION LEVEL FOR 
MEDICAL CARD OR GP VISIT CARD HOLDERS BY SOCIAL RISK 
GROUPS 
 
Source: SILC 2017. Authors’ calculations 
 
Following the same methodology of Chapter 2 and using the same 
regression specification in Table 1.1, we increased the household income 
across social risk and social class groups by the values estimated in Table 
3.3, keeping everything else the same. We then reported the changes in the 
predicted probabilities of experiencing deprivation at different levels of 
deprivation following the increase in household income. These results are 
shown in Figure 3.15. People living in a household with a person with a 
disability report the largest reduction in deprivation followed by people in 
lone parent households. There is an increase of 0.8 and 0.6 percentage 
points in the probability of reporting no deprivation for these two groups 
respectively, and of 0.5 percentage points for the most protected group of 
people over 65. Across all groups, the reduction in deprivation probabilities 
are very modest; the largest reduction is for people living in a household with 
a person with a disability and reporting four to seven deprivation items with a 
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On the right side of the chart, we report the change in the probability of 
experiencing basic deprivation (lacking at least two items). The largest 
reduction is for people living in a household with a disability at one 
percentage point followed by people living in lone parent households at 
almost 0.8 percentage points. 
 
FIGURE 3.15: CHANGE IN PREDICTED PROBABILITIES OF DEPRIVATION FOR 
MEDICAL CARD OR GP VISIT CARD HOLDERS BY SOCIAL RISK 
GROUPS  
 
Source: SILC 2017. Authors’ calculations 
 
In Figure 3.16, we present the risk of experiencing deprivation at different 
levels (enforced lack of 0 to 11 items) as well as for basic deprivation 
(lacking two or more items) across social class groups holding a medical 
card or GP visit card. There is a very strong relationship between social 
class position and the experience of deprivation. Less than three-quarters of 
the higher social class with a medical card or GP visit card have no 
deprivation, whereas it is less than one-third for those in the never worked/ 
unemployed social class with a medical card or GP visit card. Across all 
deprivation levels, the never worked/unemployed group report the highest 
probability of deprivation and it is only from four items onward that the 
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Looking at the risk of basic deprivation (lacking at least two items) on the 
right side of Figure 3.16, the probability is above 50 per cent for the never 
worked/unemployed groups, 39 per cent for the lower service or unskilled 
group. It is then much lower for the last two social classes but even among 
the most privileged group of higher social class and lower professional 
(high/low prof), the risk is almost 15 per cent.  
 
FIGURE 3.16: PREDICTED PROBABILITIES OF DEPRIVATION LEVEL OF 
MEDICAL CARD OR GP VISIT CARD HOLDERS BY SOCIAL 
CLASS 
 
Source: SILC 2017. Authors’ calculations 
 
After increasing the household income for medical card or GP visit card 
holders by the corresponding estimated values of a medical card or GP visit 
card of the groups shown in Table 3.5, we can report the changes in 
predicted probability of having different levels of deprivation using the model 
in Table 1.1. The results are reported in Figure 3.17. For people from the 
three lower social classes, this increases their probability of having no 
deprivation by 0.7 to 0.9 percentage points while it is less than half that for 
the better off class. The effect is especially important for the unemployed 
and never worked class. The relatively large effect for this group is mostly 
likely due to this group’s tendency to cite many deprivation items, as shown 
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because the group is rather spread out across the deprivation scale. 
 
As the reduction is modest at all levels of deprivation and across all social 
classes, the reduction in basic deprivation is therefore modest too as can be 
seen on the right side of the Figure. However, it is the largest with almost 1 
percentage points for the never worked/unemployed, roughly 0.7 to 0.8 for 
the following next two social classes and 0.3 for the better-off classes.  
 
FIGURE 3.17: CHANGE IN PREDICTED PROBABILITIES OF DEPRIVATION FOR 
MEDICAL CARD OR GP VISIT CARD HOLDERS BY SOCIAL 
CLASS 
 
Source: SILC 2017. Authors’ calculations 
 
3.7 Summary 
This chapter highlighted the distribution, use, and impact of medical cards 
and GP cards in Ireland. Throughout we have also focused on the social risk 
and social class differences in access, use, and impact of the cards. While 
the number of general medical cards saw a decline since 2011, we found 
that the number of GP visit cards was expanded, especially for children 
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We noted that vulnerable social risk groups were more likely to hold a 
medical or GP visit card, when compared to working age adults (Other 
adults). This was especially true when we limited our sample to children 
under the age of 16. When we considered social class, we also found that 
the most vulnerable class groupings were the most likely to hold a medical or 
GP visit card, compared to higher social class groups. Again, this result 
became more apparent when we limited our sample to children under the 
age of 16.  
 
When considering poverty and deprivation, we found that medical card and 
GP visit card holders lived in households with higher rates of deprivation 
when compared to the households without these cards. We also found that 
card holders live in households with higher levels of income poverty than 
households without cards. Finally, consistent poverty was higher in 
households with cards when compared to households without cards. This 
was also true when we limited our sample to children under the age of 16. 
Generally, we find that households who hold medical cards and GP cards 
are from more vulnerable backgrounds than households without such cards, 
suggesting that coverage of the cards is generally good.  
 
Before estimating the cards’ impact on deprivation, we had to assign them a 
monetary value. We combined SILC data with statistics from the PCRS 
annual statistics report and listed the results by social risk and social class. 
On average, we found that medical cards were particularly valuable to the 
unemployed/never worked social class group and to lone parents. Once we 
established their value, we turned to ordinal logistic regression to consider 
the baseline differences in deprivation between those receiving and not 
receiving the cards.  
 
We found that differences in deprivation between medical and GP card 
recipients could be explained by the social risk and social class of the 
household, but also by the characteristics of the head of the household and 





Finally, we made two important conclusions about the simulated impact of 
the medical and GP visit cards on deprivation. First, although the effect was 
weak, the transfer had a positive effect in that it limited the deprivation of 
medical and GP visit card holders, if only by a fraction of a percent. Second, 
and most importantly, the medical and GP visit cards impact by social risk 










This chapter considers the distribution of childcare supports and their effects 
on household deprivation. These supports are particularly important for 
parents in employment, education, training, or those seeking paid work. In 
addition, they help families with additional care obligations, such as those 
with both children and adults who need care (due to disability or illness). 
They are also important for lone parents or parents with a disabled person in 
the home, who must often balance childcare obligations and work. 
Throughout the chapter, we will discuss the supports provided,22 who gets 
them, and what the net benefits of such supports are for social risk and 
social class groups in reducing deprivation. We note that Affordable 
Childcare Scheme (ACS and later National Childcare Scheme) supports that 
were announced in Budget 2017 – to replace four childcare subsidy 
schemes in existence at the time – did not appear until much later. However, 
we also simulate their potential effects using our data. Throughout the 
chapter, we focus on households with at least one child aged 12 years or 
younger. 
 
4.1 Childcare transfers in Ireland 
Ireland’s childcare costs are some of the highest among OECD countries 
(OECD, 2019; Russell et al., 2009). Given that cost is a substantial barrier to 
childcare services, especially for vulnerable families, Ireland also has some 
of the highest rates of unmet need for formal childcare services (Privalko et 
al., 2019). Unmet childcare need is associated with higher deprivation and a 
greater chance of a mother’s (generally the main childcare provider) non-
employment (Russell et al., 2009; Privalko et al, 2019). As a result, 
understanding the impact of childcare supports on vulnerable groups sheds 
light on our understanding of deprivation, poverty, and social exclusion. 
 
The Department of Children, Equality, Disability, Integration and Youth has 
implemented several childcare support schemes. The format of these 
schemes varies from free universal childcare (up to a certain number of 
 
                                                             
 
22 We include a simulation exercise that considers one particular scheme (ACS/NCS) which was not available in 
2017 but became available in 2019. 
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hours per week for a specific age group) to direct subsidies to childcare 
providers, which reduce childcare costs for families, and financial support for 
families who wish to provide traditional home care for children.  
 
This chapter has four aims. First, we describe the main childcare 
programmes considered. Second, we outline the prevalence of child poverty 
across different age groups and the prevalence of access to childcare across 
vulnerable groups. Third, we describe the methodology used for the 
valuation of childcare supports and their equivalent childcare subsidies 
across social risk and social class groups. Finally, we use formal statistical 
models to see if the equivalent childcare subsidies for households with 
children reduce material deprivation and how these subsidies vary across 
social risk and social class groups. 
 
4.2 Childcare support programmes 
This section considers five main childcare schemes. These grew out of 
policy developments aimed at early childhood education and childcare (Child 
Care Act 1991, Regulations 2016; Amendment Child Care Act 1991, 
Regulations 2016). Table 4.1 lists the schemes, the number of recipients and 
the total cost of each scheme. The data is from the Department of Children, 
Equality, Disability, Integration and Youth (DCEDIY). 
 
The Early Childhood Care and Education (ECCE) programme is the largest, 
assisting 120,000+ recipients in 2016 and 118,000+ recipients in 2018. The 
next largest programmes are the Community Childcare Subvention (CCS), 
and Community Childcare Subvention Plus (CCSPlus) programmes, which 
assisted 27,000+ in 2016, and 38,000+ in 2018. The Community Childcare 
Subvention Universal (CCSU) programme is comparable to the previous 
programmes in 2018, where 39,000+ recipients registered. The least 
common programme is the Training and Employment Childcare programme 
(TEC), where just 6,000+ recipients were registered in 2016, and 4,000+ in 
2018. Each of these schemes differ in their openness to the public, as their 
access will be determined by children and parents/carers socio-economic 
characteristic as described below. 
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The schemes also differ in the level of budget allocated, at times based on 
the number of recipients and at times among schemes with comparable 
recipients. For example, the ECCE was the largest, and cost €273 million in 
2016, and €242 million in 2018. In the same years, the TEC was the smallest 
and cost €16 million in 2016 and €11 million in 2018. As a second example, 
the CCS and CCSPlus cost over five times more than the CCS Universal, 
despite having comparable numbers of recipients.  
 
The implementation of the National Childcare Scheme (NCS) in late 
November 2019, replaces several childcare support programmes shown in 
Table 4.1, but not the ECCE or the universal childcare subsidy. All other 
schemes have been closed to new applicants since October 2019 (CCS and 
CCSP programmes) and February 2010 (ASCC, CEC, CETS) and will 
terminate in August 2021. Later in the chapter we will also consider the 
potential gains parents make through the ACS/NCS using our simulations. 
 
TABLE 4.1: NUMBER OF CHILDREN AND APPROVED CONTRACT VALUE BY 
CHILDCARE PROGRAMME, 2016/2017 AND 2017/2018 
 Number of children 
registered 
Value (€) 
 2016/2017 2017/2018 2016/2017 2017/2018 
ECCE 120,821 118,899 273,753,848 242,015,900 
CCS & CCSPlus 27,150 38,846 42,639,511 92,459,723 
CCSU * 39,319 * 18,439,956 
TEC 6,350 4,655 16,822,504 11,817,424 
Total 149,426 185,580 333,215,863 364,733,003 
Source: Pobal 201823   
Note:  *CCSU programme started in 2017/2018 so there is no data for 2016/2017. The 
total number of children registered is greater than the sum of the individual schemes as 











Before exploring the SILC data in greater detail, we briefly present and 
discuss the main forms of childcare support offered to parents. 
 
4.2.1 Early Childhood Care and Education 
The ECCE is the most prominent form of childcare support (Table 4.1). 
Between 2006 and January 2010, in order to ease childcare costs, the 
Department of Social Protection provided a direct cash benefit, the Early 
Childcare Supplement (ECS), to qualified households with young children. 
The ECS was paid monthly in arrears per child up to the child’s fifth 
birthday.24 It was replaced in January 2010 by a universal free pre-school 
year in Early Childhood Care and Education (ECCE).  
 
The ECCE scheme was available to all children between the ages of three 
years three months, and four years six months. It was later extended to 
children aged between two years and eight months, and five years and six 
months. It provides free childcare for three hours per day, five days per week 
over 38 weeks per year. Since 2016, eligibility has increased further to a 
total average of 61 weeks (i.e. over a period of more than one year). The 
ECCE programme is only available from registered childcare providers.  
 
4.2.2 All and Community Childcare Subvention Plus 
The next most common schemes are the CCS and CCSPlus. They support 
parents from disadvantaged backgrounds as well as those in education, 
training, or low-paid jobs. The service is also available for medical card and 
GP card holders, as well as those in receipt of other social welfare 
payments. Both schemes offer reduced childcare rates for children up to the 
age of 15, who are enrolled in either community childcare services (CCS) or 
private childcare service providers (CCSPlus) registered with Tusla. The 
schemes offer flexible childcare service options, ranging from full day-care to 
very short placements. With the implementation of the new NCS in 
November 2019, these schemes are now closed to new applicants. 
 
 
                                                             
 
24 The scheme applied for an additional month after the child turned five. 
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4.2.3 Community Childcare Subvention Universal 
With the previous schemes in mind, an additional scheme was launched in 
August 2017, parents with children aged between six months and three 
years who were enrolled with the CCS programmes could now receive an 
additional transfer to reduce the cost of childcare. Depending of the number 
of hours of childcare used by the parents, the transfer offers weekly 
payments ranging from €3.50 to a maximum of €20. 
 
4.2.4 Training and Employment Childcare 
Finally, the Training and Employment Childcare programme includes several 
strands of childcare supports to parents attending eligible education or 
training courses as well as to some parents who are returning to work. The 
schemes consist of subsidised childcare places; they are the Childcare 
Education & Training Support (CETS), the Community Employment 
Childcare programme (CEC) and the After-School Child Care Scheme 
(ASCC). 
 
The CETS scheme provides childcare support for parents who are attending 
education and training programmes (these include Youthreach, vocational 
training courses, Further Education and Training (FET) courses). The 
scheme also supports parents attending Junior or Leaving Certificate 
programmes. Under the scheme, providers can only apply a minor charge 
for the service, depending on the amount of care used. The CEC offers 
similar childcare supports but for parents attending Community Employment 
schemes. Both CETS and CEC programmes offer childcare support up to a 
maximum of 50 weeks per year. Finally, the ASCC provides afterschool care 
support for children in primary school (aged four to 13). The service is 
available to three key groups. The first are parents who are in receipt of 
some benefits from the DSP. These benefits include the Working Family 
Payment, One Parent Family Payment, or unemployment related benefits. 
The second group is made up of parents who are attending a DSP 
employment programme to upskill or re-train. The final group is parents who 
have increased their level of employment. With the introduction of the NCS, 
registration to this programme closed in February 2020 and the programme 
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will end in August 2021. 
Prior to the introduction of the National Childcare Scheme in late 2019, there 
was a range of support offered to parents with young children. These 
supports are not all universal, as outlined above. Some are means-tested 
and designed for unemployed or inactive households. However, general 
support also exists. It should be noted that the main aim of the schemes and 
programmes is to provide children with quality care and to support families 
wishing to participate in the labour market. 
 
4.3 Child poverty  
Recent figures from the CSO (2019) show that children aged under 18 
years, are most likely to experience poverty compared to other broad age 
groups. We illustrate the trend in Figure 4.1. 
 
Children’s income poverty risk peaked between 2004 and 2005, before declining 
gradually but child poverty rates were still the highest across all age groups from 
2005 onwards. The deprivation rate is different. For all age groups the rate rose from 
2007 before peaking in 2013. It fell gradually after 2013 before levelling off in 2017. 
Once again, children experienced a consistently higher rate of deprivation than 
adults. Regarding consistent poverty, the rate began to rise from 2008 before 
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Source:  CSO Statbank [Downloaded 25th of November 2019] 
 
Why do children live in higher rates of deprivation and poverty? While our 
aim here is not to explore this question, we can comment on previous 
findings involving children, maternal employment and deprivation. Part of the 
answer lies in mothers’ restricted capacity to participate in employment due 
to demands of childcare in the context of unequal division of responsibility 
between parents and the high cost of childcare services. Further, unequal 
gender division of housework and caring responsibilities (children and/or 
adult dependent(s)) among couples and expensive childcare costs, place 
additional barriers to mothers’ labour market participation (Russell et al., 
2019, Privalko et al., 2019).  
 
Many factors can influence a mother’s return to work after a period of leave, 
from financial incentives to personal preferences, but age and the number of 
children in the home have a particularly strong and negative impact on 
mother’s return to work (McGinnity et al., 2013). Mothers with an infant aged 
less than six months are less likely to be employed than women with older 
children. Further, mothers with infants who also live in larger households are 
less likely to use non-parental childcare (McGinnity et al., 2013). We 
therefore expect that mothers are more likely to provide parental childcare 
for young children compared to older children. This decision may increase 
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Figure 4.2 lists poverty outcomes by children’s age. We broadly consider 
three main groups: those of pre-school age (0 to 5), those of primary school-
age (6 to 11) and those of secondary school age (12 to 17). Figure 4.2 does 
not reflect the expectation above. In fact, for each of the three measures of 
poverty and deprivation, the youngest children have the lowest chance of 
disadvantage while older children have the highest chance of disadvantage. 
This pattern emerges for every measure of poverty and deprivation. 
 
Poverty-risk increased over time from the youngest (12 per cent), to those 
aged six to 11 (19 per cent) and those aged 12 to 17 (23 per cent). The high 
rate of poverty-risk among older children could stem from the equivalence 
scale approach, where a child aged 14 and over receives the same weight 
as an adult (though the deprivation rate, which is not dependent on income, 
still shows a disadvantage for this group, relative to the other age groups).  
 
The age gap is much less pronounced when looking at material deprivation. 
Here younger children (0-5) report a deprivation rate of 19 per cent, while 
those aged six to 11 and those aged 12 to 17 both report a rate of roughly 25 
per cent. The sharpest difference between age groups emerges in the 
measure of consistent poverty, with young children citing 6 per cent and 
those aged 12 to 17 citing almost double the rate, 11 per cent which is due 
to higher at-risk-of poverty and deprivation rates for the latter age group.25 
 
 
                                                             
 
25 For children aged up to five years old, poverty results broken down by age show that children aged 0-2 




FIGURE 4.2: POVERTY OUTCOMES BY AGE GROUP OF CHILDREN 
 
Source: SILC 2017 
 
4.4 Formal childcare usage 
This section considers the SILC data for Ireland, describing who uses 
childcare services and the poverty and deprivation rates of these users. 
 
4.4.1 Poverty and childcare usage 
Access and use of formal childcare for young children depends on several 
factors, including the age of children, the presence of childcare facilities in 
their area, and the characteristics of these facilities (opening hours, 
availability, quality of service provided, etc.). It also depends on socio-
demographic characteristics of the children’s parents and their levels of 
entitlements (household income, number of parents or family members at 
work). Focusing on a broad age group of children, Privalko et al. (2019) 
show that vulnerable families in Ireland are more likely to report unmet need 
for formal childcare when compared to less vulnerable family types.26 For 
example, the level of unmet need for formal childcare among lone parents in 
 
                                                             
 
26 We used the same definition of formal childcare as done in Privalko et al. (2019) where formal childcare is 
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Ireland is 25 per cent compared to 13 per cent for families with two working 
age adults.  
 
Figure 4.3 reports the percentage of households using formal childcare, split 
by different poverty types. This figure helps to compare vulnerable and non-
vulnerable households in terms of access to childcare.27 Overall, 44 per cent 
of children aged less than five years use formal childcare facilities. However, 
within this group, there are stark differences between deprived (37 per cent) 
and non-deprived households (45 per cent), and income poor (31 per cent) 
and non-income poor households (45 per cent) in their use of childcare 
services. Generally, children from poor households are less likely to use 
formal childcare when compared to non-poor households.  
 
Crucially, this difference is reduced for children aged between three and 
five.28 This age group is particularly important because the means-tested 
and universal childcare options noted above apply specifically to this group 
of children. As a result, we see an overall increase in childcare coverage in 
terms of the total rate, and a decline in inequality between deprived and non-
deprived households. This emerges in Figure 4.3: more children are using 
formal childcare overall (58 per cent) and the social disparity between 
deprived and non-deprived children is now lower than it was for the overall 
category (children aged 0-5).  
 
                                                             
 
27 The figure focuses only on households with children under the age of five. 
28 The number of cases of children aged under three who are either poor or deprived and using formal 
childcare is too small to report and therefore we cannot compare childcare use of children for this age group 
by poverty status.  
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FIGURE 4.3: USE OF FORMAL CHILDCARE BY CHILDREN AGE AND BY 
POVERTY STATUS 
 
Source: SILC 2017 
 
Results from Figure 4.3 show that disadvantaged children use less formal 
childcare than non-disadvantaged children. However, it is also important to 
consider the duration of childcare services; inequality could also exist within 
groups that use childcare. Figure 4.4 reports the average number of hours 
spent in formal childcare by poverty status; this is further split by age of 
children. Overall, children aged 0 to 5 (who use formal childcare) spend on 
average 20 hours per week in childcare. However, there are significant 
differences in the duration of care used by poor (16 hours) and non-poor 
households (20 hours) who use childcare and deprived (16 hours) and non-
deprived households (20 hours) who use childcare. As before, some of this 
gap closes when we consider children aged 3 to 5, due to the many 
childcare services which apply after the child turns three. However, even 
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FIGURE 4.4: MEAN WEEKLY NUMBER OF HOURS IN FORMAL CHILDCARE BY 
CHILDREN AGE AND BY POVERTY STATUS 
 
Source: SILC 2017 
 
4.5 Social risk, social class and childcare usage 
So far, we have shown that poor children have less access to childcare 
services than non-poor children. We have also shown that the duration of 
childcare differs between poor and non-poor children and households. This 
picture emerges too for deprived and non-deprived children or households. 
We now consider social risk and social class differences as possible 
explanations for these effects. Figure 4.5 shows that 44 per cent of children 
aged between 0 and 5 use formal childcare services. However, splitting this 
group by social risk reveals significant differences, with lone parents (41 per 
cent), and adults with a disability (31 per cent) reporting lower use of formal 
childcare than working age adults with children (46 per cent). If we consider 
children aged three to five, we see a general increase in overall childcare 
and more equality between risk groups in their levels of access, relative to 
“other adults” (working age adults who are not lone parents and who do not 
have a disability in the home). The overall increase for this narrower age 
group is probably due to the use of the ECCE scheme. However, it is also 
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it is significantly less prevalent than among all children under the age of five. 
FIGURE 4.5: USE OF FORMAL CHILDCARE BY CHILDREN AGE AND BY 
SOCIAL RISK 
 
Source: SILC (2017) 
Note: The sample size for children aged 3 to 5 in families with a person with a disability is 
too small to be reported.  
 
As before, we should also consider the duration of childcare among 
respondents with access (Figure 4.6). Children aged 0 to five from 
households with two working age adults (other adults and children) spend 
more time in childcare with almost 21 hours on average. Lone parents using 
formal childcare receive less care on average (17 hours), as do households 
with a disability (16 hours). Surprisingly, Figure 4.6 reveals that children 
aged three to five receive similar hours of care when compared to the overall 



























FIGURE 4.6: MEAN WEEKLY HOURS IN FORMAL CHILDCARE BY CHILDREN’S 
AGE AND BY SOCIAL RISK 
 
Source: SILC (2017) 
Note: The sample size for children aged 3 to 5 in families with a person with a disability is 
too small to be reported.  
 
 
If we substitute social class for social risk categories, a similar difference 
emerges in terms of access to childcare services. Figure 4.7 lists the 
average use of formal childcare by social class, highlighting that higher 
social class groups (51 per cent) have the greatest level of access when 
compared to middle (35 per cent) and lower social class groups (35 per 
cent). If we limit our sample to households with children aged three to five, 
we again see an increase in the use of formal childcare across children, and 
a closure of the gap between classes. Among these households, higher 
social class groups (65 per cent) still have more access than middle (51 per 




























FIGURE 4.7: USE OF FORMAL CHILDCARE BY CHILDREN AGE AND BY 
SOCIAL CLASS 
 
Source: SILC (2017) 
Note: The sample size for children aged three to five in unemployed social class is too 
small to be reported. 
 
As before, we can consider differences in hours of care, among respondents 
who use childcare services. Here too, higher social class households (22 
hours) secure more care than middle (13 hours) and lower social class 
groups (16 hours). As before, this difference remains unchanged for 
households with children aged between three and five years, where the 



















































































FIGURE 4.8: MEAN WEEKLY NUMBER OF HOURS IN FORMAL CHILDCARE BY 
CHILDREN AGE AND BY SOCIAL CLASS 
 
Source: SILC (2017) 
Note: The sample size for children aged three to five in unemployed social class is too 
small to be reported. 
 
4.6 Estimating the value of childcare support 
Many of the vulnerable groups above receive transfers to cover childcare costs, this 
section attempts to value these transfers. Starting with the overall, universal 
entitlements, children aged three to five were entitled to the ECCE scheme, where 
they could receive up to 15 weekly hours of free care. These schemes were 
available in 2017. Additional hours of care, beyond this 15-hour limit, are subject to 
childcare subsidies. On behalf of the DYCA, Pobal pays the registered childcare 
provider a capitation fee of €64.50 per week per child registered under the ECCE. 
  
Also, families with children outside the eligible age for the ECCE but who are 
attending childcare facilities such as pre- or after-school care, may also be eligible 
for means tested hourly subsidies. 
 
It is important to note while the fees paid by Pobal to the childcare providers 
are the same across the country, there are large variations in the fees 





















































































differences in out of pocket payments made by parents (Pobal,2018).  
 
We also use the ESRI’s SWITCH (Simulating Welfare Income Tax Childcare 
and Health) model to simulate a cash value of subsidies available to families 
entitled to care under the Affordable Childcare Scheme. The first payments 
in this scheme were made in 2019 but we are interested in the impact of this 
scheme on deprivation had the scheme been made available in 2017 as 
announced in Budget 2017. The simulations are based on the version of the 
scheme that was described in DCEDIY documentation in 2017 (DCYA, 
2016) and that families would have been entitled to if the scheme had been 
introduced at the time. SWITCH simulates the full set of tax-benefit 
parameters that were in place in 2017. These simulated income sources are 
then used to calculate means using the means testing rules underlying the 
National Childcare Scheme. The entitlement and amount of subsidies 
available to families with children are based on the parental labour force 
status, the household income, the age of the child, the educational 
enrolment status of the child and the childcare usage. These are calculated 
at the individual level for each family. However, the SWITCH model is 
currently based off a pooled sample of 2013, 2014 and 2015 waves of SILC. 
As such, we do not directly observe the subsidy entitlement for families in 
2017 SILC. Instead, we impute the average value of hourly subsidy rates for 
families in 2017 SILC by using average subsidy rates based on family level 
disposable income from the outputs produced by SWITCH. 29 These nominal 
2017 rates are shown in Table 4.2.  
 
We then multiply these rates by the number of hours of childcare usage 
reported by households in the 2017 SILC dataset. This captures current 





                                                             
 
29 Detailed description of the SWITCH simulation of the subsidies is available in DCEDIY (2017). 
30 An alternative model procedure would be to impute average weekly values directly from SWITCH. This 
method relies on childcare usage patterns from 2013 to 2015, which likely underestimates recent changes in 
demand for childcare, given the sharp change in employment since the 2008 Great Recession. 
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TABLE 4.2: MAXIMUM HOURLY SUBSIDIES IN 2017  
Category SHS/EHS* 
Hourly rate for a child under 1 year €5.11 
Hourly rate for a child aged 1 year €4.37 
Hourly rate for a child aged 2 years €4.18 
Hourly rate for a child aged 3-5 years and not in school €3.95 
Hourly rate for children of primary school-age €3.76 
Hourly rate for children of secondary school-age €3.76 
 
Source: DYCA (2017) from SWITCH 
Note: * Standard Hours Subsidy (SHS) are subsidised hours when at least one parent is not 
at work/education and Enhanced Hours Subsidy (EHS) when both parents (and only parent) 
are in work/education. 
 
Based on these rates and on the average number of hours children (up to 
the age of 13) spend in formal childcare, Table 4.3 reports the corresponding 
estimate of childcare subsidies (ECCE and hourly subsidies) across social 
risk and social class groups. As mentioned previously, these are imputed 

















TABLE 4.3: MEAN HOURS OF FORMAL CHILDCARE AND ANNUAL 
EQUIVALENT CHILDCARE SUBSIDIES BY SOCIAL RISK AND 
SOCIAL CLASS HOUSEHOLDS  
GROUPS 
Mean weekly hours formal 
childcare  
(children aged 0-12 years) 
Mean annual childcare 
subsidies 
Social risk   
Lone parent and children 19.8 €3,244 
Adult with a disability and 
children 
* * 
Other adults and children 23.3 €1,357 
Social class   
High & lower professional 25.6 €1,076 




Never worked/unemployed * * 
Total 22.4 €1,638 
 
Source: SILC (2017) 
Note: We are unable to list values for households with a disability and households who 
are unemployed due to CSO guidelines about the minimum number of cases required. 
However, because in the modelling simulation below we use equivalised household income 
across all individuals we have enough cases to use the values that are not shown in Table 
4.3.  
 
Having imputed these values in the data, we can consider their impact on 
measures of deprivation for families. 
 
4.7 Reduction effect of childcare support on 
material deprivation 
In Chapter 1 we presented the ordered logistic regression model to predict 
level of deprivation across social risk and social class groups. This section 
uses the same methodology as in Chapter 2 to predict deprivation with a 
score ranging from 0 items (no deprivation) to a maximum of 11 items 
(deprived on all items) controlling for a range of individual and household 
socio-economic characteristics. We predict group differences in the 
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probability of citing each item of deprivation from 0 (not deprived) to 11 
(deprived on all items) for people in receipt of childcare support. 
 
In Figure 4.9 we report the predicted probabilities of experiencing different 
level of deprivation (from 0 to 11 items) as well as experiencing basic 
deprivation (score of at least two items) controlling for socio-economic and 
household characteristics as shown above.31  
 
Thinking first of the social risk groups, other working-age households with 
children (other adults) have the highest predicted probability of citing “no 
deprivation” (77 per cent). In contrast, lone parent households have a far 
lower predicted probability of citing “no deprivation” (below 34 per cent) as 
do families with a person with a disability (below 40 per cent). There is then 
a downward trend as we move to cumulatively higher levels of deprivation. 
Here, deprivation is higher for lone parents and families with a person with a 
disability, while it is almost non-existent for other working age households 
(other households). This is especially true after three items. The final bars on 
the right side of the chart shows the predicted probabilities of experiencing 
basic deprivation (two+ items) with very little difference between lone parent 
households and families with a person with a disability, respectively at 46 per 
cent and 43 per cent while it is only 11 per cent for other households with 









                                                             
 
31 The predicated probabilities for experiencing basic deprivation (at least two items out of 11 items) are 
drawn from a logistic regression available in the Appendix (Table A.1). 
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FIGURE 4.9: PREDICTED PROBABILITIES ON DEPRIVATION LEVEL BY 
SOCIAL RISK GROUPS, SILC 2017  
 
Source: SILC (2017). Authors’ calculations. Households with children in formal childcare 
 
We now consider the effects of childcare transfers in limiting deprivation. We 
do this in two steps. First, following the ordered logistic regression, we 
predict the probability of experiencing different levels of deprivation (as 
shown in Figure 4.9). Second, we add the equivalent childcare subsidy to 
our current measure of household income and run the prediction a second 
time. We then compare both sets of predicted probabilities and report the 
change. 
 
Figure 4.10 shows that the cash value of childcare support would likely 
increase the odds of experiencing 0 deprivation for lone parents (2.2 
percentage points) and households with a disability (one percentage point). 
There is also an increase in the predicted probability of experiencing one 
deprivation item only, which adds up to approximately half of a percentage 
point for lone parents and households with a person with a disability. As we 
move along higher deprivation levels, the percentage of vulnerable 
households experiencing deprivation is reduced slightly (the change 
becomes negative) and the relative larger reduction occurs at about three to 
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a high score of deprivation (over the top-half of the distribution) only 
experience a slight improvement in their level of deprivation. For these 
families, this could mean that their level of deprivation is so high that the 
equivalent subsidies of childcare support are not large enough to improve 
their economic circumstances. There is also no improvement for other 
households and children at all deprivation levels. 
 
Looking at the measure of basic deprivation (deprived on at least two items) 
on the right side of the chart, the percentage of lone parents and families 
with a person with a disability experiencing basic deprivation is being 
reduced respectively by almost three percentage points and one and a half 
of a percentage point but with almost no effect for other households with 
children. The effect is greatest for lone-parent households. 
 
FIGURE 4.10: CHANGE IN PREDICTED PROBABILITIES ON DEPRIVATION 
LEVEL BY SOCIAL RISK GROUPS  
 
Source: SILC (2017). Authors’ calculations. Households with children in formal childcare 
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levels of deprivation and basic deprivation across social class groups. There 
is a very strong social class pattern in the risk of deprivation. Starting with 
having no deprivation at all, there is a strong contrast between the most 
disadvantaged group of the never worked/unemployed group and the other 
groups. Indeed, while only 14 per cent of the never worked/unemployed 
group have no deprivation at all, it increases to 48 per cent for the lower 
services, 63 per cent for the inter/tech and 79 per cent for the high social 
class group. There is thus very little difference in the probability of being 
deprived on one item only between the bottom three social classes with 
values ranging between 14 per cent and 18 per cent. As we move then along 
higher levels of deprivation, all social class groups are reporting decreasing 
probabilities of deprivation except for the never worked/unemployed group 
and it is only from four to five items and over that their probability decreases. 
 
As a result, this sharp social class differentiation appears in the probability of 
experiencing basic deprivation (lacking at least two items) presented in the 
right part of the chart. The risk is 71 per cent for the never worked/ 
unemployed, 35 per cent for the lower services, 21 per cent for the 





FIGURE 4.11: PREDICTED PROBABILITIES ON DEPRIVATION LEVEL BY 
SOCIAL CLASS 
 
Source: SILC (2017). Authors’ calculations 
 
After having imputed a corresponding value for childcare support, we report 
in Figure 4.12 the changes in the predicted probabilities for each level of 
deprivation as well as for experiencing basic deprivation across social 
classes. The mean cash values of childcare support shown in Table 4.3 
suggest that we might expect a greater effect on deprivation for the lower 
social classes. Looking at the effect in the probability of experiencing no 
deprivation, the never worked/unemployed class has the largest increase 
with 1.5 percentage point, followed by the lower services at 0.6 percentage 
point and then the inter/tech at almost half a percentage point. There is also 
an increase of 0.6 percentage point in the probability of experiencing one 
deprivation item for the never worked/unemployed but no increase for the 
other classes. Most of the reduction for the bottom three classes happens at 
three to six/seven items but mostly for the never worked/unemployed group. 
Overall, the higher social class group does not benefit from any reduction in 
deprivation though being relatively quite low originally.  
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side of the chart, the never worked/unemployed group experiences the 
largest reduction of deprivation. This group has a fall of 4 percentage points 
and it is around 1.3 percentage point for the next two social classes but there 
is no reduction for the better-off social class.   
 
These results suggest that the most disadvantaged social class group 
benefits the most in the reduction of deprivation once we take account of the 
cash equivalent attached to the provision of childcare support, but their level 
of deprivation still stays extremely high.  
 
FIGURE 4.12: CHANGE IN PREDICTED PROBABILITIES ON DEPRIVATION 
LEVEL BY SOCIAL CLASS 
 
Source: SILC (2017). Authors’ calculations 
 
4.8 Summary 
This chapter considered childcare supports and their impact on material 
deprivation. Ireland has produced several schemes aimed at aiding families 
with young children, some of these are universal in that they focus on all 
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vulnerable groups which likely need additional assistance from the state. We 
find that differences in deprivation tied to social risk and social class can be 
explained by differences in income, debt, and other resources, as well as 
household composition and the number of children in the home. 
 
Crucially, we find that social risk groups with young children are the most 
likely to cite deprivation in the home. Although we find that the cash 
equivalent of childcare supports has a minor effect on deprivation, we note 
that vulnerable groups experience the largest deprivation-reduction derived 
from these supports when compared to other working-age adults with 
children under five. This result also emerges for social class groups, 
especially the unemployed. While there are class differences in material 
deprivation, the benefits of childcare supports are particularly pronounced 
among unemployed and lower social class groups.  
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Chapter 5 




This chapter considers the three tied supports and transfer types together to 
capture their cumulative effect. We consider how the three benefits are 
distributed and what their impact on deprivation is. We also consider the 
social risk and social class differences of these.  
 
5.1 Distribution of receipt of tied transfers and non-
cash benefits 
Notten (2015) notes that Ireland’s benefits are especially common, with 
coverage of 70 per cent. We find a similar rate in Table 5.1, with just 31 per 
cent of households not receiving any of the transfers or schemes mentioned. 
Most households receive one transfer (44 per cent), with a minority receiving 
two or more (25 per cent). A very small portion of respondents receive each 
of the three transfers, which is highly uncommon. 
 
TABLE 5.1: PORTION OF RECIPIENTS BY NUMBER OF TIED SCHEMES 
RECEIVED (%), 2017 







Source: SILC (2017). Authors’ calculations 
 
There are important differences between social risk groups in the use of 
schemes (Table 5.2). Most lone-parent households rely on two schemes or 
more (48 per cent), and only a minority of lone parents do not access a 
scheme at all (16 per cent). For households with a disability, a majority 
access one scheme (40 per cent), although a significant portion of 
households rely on two or more schemes (38 per cent); as before, only a 




This pattern is reversed when we consider working-age households (Other 
adults and children). Here, most households do not receive any transfer or 
scheme (40 per cent), and few receive more than one scheme (23 per cent). 
However, households with older adults (Other over 65) again contain a 
majority reliant on one scheme (69 per cent) and a minority reliant on more 
than one scheme (23 per cent). In short, the distribution of schemes seems 
to depend on the social risk group of the household.  
 
TABLE 5.2: NUMBER OF SCHEMES RECEIVED BY SOCIAL RISK GROUP (%)  
Social risk groups 0 1 2+ Total 
Lone parent & children 16.4 34.8 48.8 100 
Adult with disability & children 21.2 40.0 38.7 100 
Other adults & children 40.4 36.5 23.2 100 
Other over 65 17.7 69.7 12.6 100 
Overall population 31.0 44.3 24.7 100 
 
Source: SILC (2017). Authors’ calculations 
 
We find similar patterns when we consider social class. High social class 
groups are split by those who receive no transfer or scheme and those who 
receive just one transfers or scheme (39 per cent). A minority receive two or 
more schemes (21 per cent). Intermediate or middle-class groups are more 
reliant on schemes, with a majority claiming just one scheme (45 per cent) 
and a minority claiming two or more schemes. 
 
The latter two class groups are far more dependent on the transfers and 
subsidies compared to the higher groups. Lowest social class groups mostly 
rely on at least one scheme (50 per cent), and a minority rely on none of 
them (18 per cent). The unemployed social class also resemble this pattern 








TABLE 5.3: NUMBER OF SCHEMES RECEIVED BY SOCIAL CLASS (%) 
Social risk groups 0 1 2+ Total 
High + low prof 39.3 39.4 21.3 100 
Inter/tech/self-empl 34.2 45.2 20.6 100 
Lower serv/unskilled 17.8 49.9 32.2 100 
Unemployed/never worked 16.8 51.7 31.6 100 
Overall population 31.0 44.3 24.7 100 
 
Source: SILC (2017). Authors’ calculations 
 
Regarding households who receive two or more schemes or transfers, we 
find that most of these households rely on a combination of housing 
payments and medical cards or GP visit cards. The other permutations are 
less common (Table 5.4). 
 
TABLE 5.4: NUMBER OF SCHEMES RECEIVED BY TYPE OF SCHEME 
RECEIVED (%) 
Number of schemes 
received 
Schemes received % of 
households 
0 None 31.0 
1 Housing OR medical/GP card OR childcare 
support 
44.3 
2 Housing AND medical/GP card 16.9 
Medical/GP card AND childcare support 4.3 
Housing AND childcare support 0.9 




 Total 100.0 
 
Source: SILC (2017). Authors’ calculations 
 
These differences can be further split by social risk and social class. Table 
5.5 shows that social risk groups differ in terms of their most common 
choice. Vulnerable social risk groups are more likely to use a housing related 
transfer and a medical card or GP visit card, while working-age adults use 




TABLE 5.5: TIED TRANSFERS RECEIVED BY SOCIAL RISK GROUP, 
HOUSEHOLDS (%)  









None 16.4 21.2 40.4 17.7 
Housing OR medical/GP 
card OR childcare 
support 
34.8 40.0 36.5 69.7 
Housing AND medical/GP 
card 
34.9 34.2 12.5 12.4 
Housing AND childcare 
support 
* * 1.5 * 
Medical/GP card AND 
childcare support 
* * 6.3 * 
Housing AND medical/GP 
card AND childcare  
support 
* * 2.9 * 
Total 100 100 100 100 
 
Source: SILC (2017). CSO rules prevent us from reporting on categories with few 
observations. These are marked with a star [*] symbol 
 
Table 5.6 suggests a similar relationship emerges for social class groups, 
where the more vulnerable groups are more likely to rely on both the housing 




TABLE 5.6: TRANSFERS RECEIVED BY SOCIAL CLASS GROUP, 
HOUSEHOLDS (%) 









None 39.3 34.2 17.8 16.8 
Housing OR medical/ 
GP card OR childcare 
support 
39.4 45.2 49.9 51.7 
Housing AND 
medical/GP card 
11.1 14.6 26.2 26.2 
Housing AND childcare 
support 
* * * * 
Medical/GP card AND 
childcare support 
5.8 3.9 * * 
Housing AND 
medical/GP card AND 
childcare support 
* * 2.9 * 
Total 100 100 100 100 
 
Source: SILC (2017). CSO rules prevent us from reporting on categories with few 
observations. These are marked with a star [*] symbol 
 
As in the previous chapters, we turn to differences in deprivation between 
those receiving transfers and those not in receipt of transfers. However, in 
this section we are particularly interested in the difference in deprivation 
between those receiving no transfers, those receiving one, and those 
receiving multiple transfers. 
 
From the model presented in Chapter 1, we consider the predicted 
probability of each value of deprivation for households receiving one scheme 
and two schemes or more separately. To make these differences more 
apparent, we fix the y-scale to a value of 100.  
 
We first consider social risk groups receiving one transfer or supplement, 
finding that lone parents and households with a disability are the most likely 
to experience deprivation. Most advantaged groups are typically unlikely to 
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cite a deprivation. However, among respondents receiving two or more 
transfers, we find that predicted probabilities of having no deprivation are 
smaller, suggesting these households see more deprivation than their 
counterparts receiving only one scheme. For example, half of children in 
lone-parent households and those in a household with a person with a 
disability lack at least two items, while it is 43 percent and 34 percent 
respectively for their counterparts in receipt of one scheme. Older 
respondents who receive two schemes are the least likely to experience 
deprivation. 
 
FIGURE 5.1: PREDICTED PROBABILITIES ON DEPRIVATION LEVEL BY 


























Lone parent with children People with disability and children




Source: SILC (2017). Authors’ calculations 
When simulating the effects of transfers, we note two separate patterns for those 
receiving one transfer. Among households receiving one transfer, each social risk 
group experiences a minor increase in their predicted probability of citing no 
deprivation, on average (less than 0.7 percentage point). However, among 
households receiving two transfers or more, we note that transfers have a far larger 
effect, and that vulnerable social risk groups benefit the most from these transfers. 
Indeed, there is a reduction of just above three percentage points of children in lone 
parent households lacking at least two items, and less than three percentage points 
for children in a household with a person with a disability. This could be due to a size 
effect with the number of schemes they receive or that they receive the most 
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FIGURE 5.2: CHANGE IN PREDICTED PROBABILITIES OF DEPRIVATION BY 
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We can take a similar approach for social class groups, taking the predicted 
probability of each value of deprivation. We consider respondents receiving 
one scheme and two schemes separately. To make these differences more 
apparent, we fix the y-scale to a value of 100.  
 
Those receiving one scheme are more likely to cite no deprivation than those 
receiving two or more schemes, and the difference is particularly large for 
the never worked/unemployed group. Within each category, however, higher 
social class groups are the least likely to cite deprivation and gradually this 
rate declines between class groups. The majority of those who are in the 
unemployed category cite one or more deprivation items. This is not the 
case with the other class groups, where the majority experience no 
deprivation. 
 
Among those who receive two or more transfers, higher social class and 
middle social class groups have a majority where citing no deprivation 
whatsoever. The two lower social class groups have a majority that cites at 
least one level of deprivation. This is especially true for the unemployed 
social class group, where the majority is in deprivation (almost 60 per cent 
cites two or more deprivation items). 
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FIGURE 5.3: PREDICTED PROBABILITIES ON DEPRIVATION LEVEL BY 
NUMBER OF SCHEMES RECEIVED BY SOCIAL CLASS (%) 
 
 
Source: SILC (2017). Authors’ calculations 
As before, we can simulate the effect of transfers for social class groups. 
Thinking of those who receive only a single transfer or subsidy, the effect of 
the transfer is relatively minor, with unemployed social classes benefitting 
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an increase of less than one percentage point reporting no deprivation for 
the unemployed social class and less than 0.3 percentage points for the 
higher social class. The reduction is also relatively small across social class 
groups for those reporting at least two deprivation items. The reduction 
pattern is much stronger for those receiving two transfers, but mostly for the 
most vulnerable. First, there is a large increase of three percentage points of 
the unemployed group reporting no deprivation (and above one percent for 
one deprivation item) and it is almost two percentage points for the inter and 
lower service social class. Second, the unemployed group also sees its 
deprivation level being reduced at about one percentage point halfway on 
the distribution of deprivation. Because of these large changes, there is a 
reduction of more than four percentage points for the unemployed social 
class lacking at least two items, half that for the inter and lower service social 




FIGURE 5.4: CHANGE IN PREDICTED PROBABILITIES OF DEPRIVATION BY 
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This chapter considered all schemes together, exploring who receives 
multiple schemes and whether these recipients were less likely to cite 
deprivation. Multiple schemes were not common but vulnerable social risk 
and social class groups were more likely to have two or more schemes. We 
also found that those with multiple schemes saw a greater effect in 
deprivation reduction, and that vulnerable social risk and social class groups 
were the most likely to benefit from multiple schemes, although single 
schemes also lowered their predicted probability of citing deprivation. The 
reduction effect for those lacking at least two items and in receipt of two 
schemes was strong for children in lone-parent households and those in 
households with a person with a disability but it was even stronger for 
children in never worked/unemployed social class.  
  
 






Throughout this report we have looked at a range of supports which 
captured the coverage and effectiveness of social transfers tied to housing, 
childcare, and medical needs. These tied transfers are particularly important 
as they cover childcare, healthcare and housing, which are pivotal expenses 
for any family. They were prevalent: almost 70 per cent of households 
received at least one type of transfer and almost 25 per cent of households 
received at least two. They were also specific: in terms of coverage, we 
found that vulnerable social risk groups often had the highest chances of 
securing transfers and non-cash benefits when compared to working age 
adults. We also found that vulnerable social class groups such as the 
unemployed or those who have never worked had high chances of securing 
these transfers and services.  
 
Most importantly, we noted that tied transfers and support services have a 
variable but positive effect, in that they limit the chance of deprivation. 
Finally, we noted that vulnerable social risk and social class groups are the 
most likely to benefit from transfers and services, when compared to groups 
that are better insulated from poverty and social exclusion, like those in the 
highest social class grouping. We briefly consider each transfer type and 
summarise the conclusions of each of these benefits. 
 
Regarding housing transfers, we found a negative relationship between the 
value of transfers and deprivation, meaning that transfers are associated 
with lower predicted probabilities of deprivation. Finally, we noted group 
differences in this effect, where housing transfers were the most effective for 
vulnerable social risk and vulnerable social class groups.  
 
Regarding health-related transfers, we found a difference in deprivation 
between those receiving a medical card or a GP visit card and those who do 
not receive these. Once again, we could explain this difference by 
considering the financial situation of the household. As with housing 
transfers, this difference between recipients and non-recipients could be 
explained by differences in financial circumstances and hardship, as in many 
cases access to medical cards is based on household means. We also 
found that medical support reduced the predicted probability of material 
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deprivation. Lastly, we again found group differences in this effect, with 
vulnerable social risk and vulnerable social class groups having benefitted 
more from medical supports than more protected groups as we would expect 
with a very high coverage for the former groups.  
 
Regarding childcare transfers, we could not compare the recipients of 
subsidies to non-recipients of subsidies, since these are universal for 
families with children in certain age groups. However, we were able to 
simulate the impact of these subsidies on material deprivation by attaching a 
cash value to the care provided. We found that childcare support subsidies 
limited the impact of deprivation and that, as before, this reduction was most 
prominent among vulnerable social risk and social class groups.  
 
In general, we recommend that future research explores the link between 
transfers, services and social exclusion. This is especially true for childcare 
subsidies, which could support greater participation in the labour market, and 
as a result lower deprivation for the household. Previous research has 
shown that Ireland reports high rates of unmet need for formal childcare 
(Grotti et al., 2019), and that this rate is higher in Ireland when compared to 
several European countries (Privalko et al., 2019). More specifically, 
childcare transfers may have important implications for parents’ participation 
in the labour market, in that increasing transfers may encourage employment 
or job seeking. We offer the following policy implications. 
 
1. The benefits examined here had the expected impact in reducing 
deprivation, so they have a role to play in reducing social exclusion. 
Although transfer programmes are expensive, they reduce deprivation 
and help facilitate a “customary life”, especially for lone parents and 
the unemployed. 
2. Those receiving the benefits were generally those most in need – the 
vulnerable social risk groups and social classes. Thus, means-tested 
transfers reach those who need help. However, more universal 
transfers should not be overlooked, as they have an important impact 
on vulnerable groups. For example, while we find that many childcare 
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transfers are open to most parents of young children, it is lone parents 
and the unemployed who see the greatest return on these transfers in 
terms of a reduction in predicted deprivation.  
3. The impact of the different schemes varied between social risk 
groups: housing transfers were particularly important for lone parents 
and respondents with a disability; medical card were particularly 
important for people with disabilities; childcare benefits were 
particularly important for lone parents. 
4. The social risk groups benefitting most from the schemes in the 
simulations remain those most deprived (lone parents and households 
where an adult has a disability). While transfers limit the deprivation 
faced by these groups, they are on average more likely to face 
deprivation than the remaining groups, even after transfers are 
considered. Therefore, the effectiveness of these transfers should be 
compared to the effectiveness of some alternative policy strategies. 
6.1 Limitations 
The analysis presented here comes with one specific limitation and one 
general limitation. The first specific limitation is tied to housing transfers.  
 
We could not include HAP transfers when considering housing transfers. 
This measure was not available in SILC 2017 data, despite the existence of 
HAP at that time. As a result, we lack a substantial transfer from our 
analysis. SILC data on HAP is available for 2018. Here too, there is likely an 
association between this scheme and lower rates of deprivation among its 
beneficiaries. 
 
The more general limitation is that because of the relatively small sample 
size, we are not able to make social risk and social class conclusions about 
more specific entitlements such as housing benefits versus housing 
supplements. Given the small sample size of housing supplement 
recipients, it is not possible to further split these values by subgroups, due to 
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TABLE A.1: MODELS PREDICTING HIGHER LEVELS OF DEPRIVATION, SILC 
(2017) 





Ref: Other people over 65      
Lone parents 0.69** 0.36* 0.21 0.31* 0.48 
Adult with disability & children 0.51*** 0.39** 0.41** 0.30* 0.63** 
Other adults & children -0.02 -0.09 -0.14 0.00 -0.13 
Ref: Highest social class      
Middle social class -0.05 0.07 0.04 -0.12 0.08 
Lowest social class 0.18 0.30** 0.32** 0.23* 0.36* 
Unemployed or never worked 0.37 0.19 0.17 0.21 0.32 
Ref: Head of household male      




0.39*** 0.14 0.38** 




0.01 0.01 0.01 
Ref: Head of household born in 
Ireland 
     












Ref: Head of household 
working 
     
Head of household unemployed 0.74*** 0.62*** 0.57*** 0.45** 0.83*** 
Head of household in education 0.57 0.51* 0.25 0.59** 0.27 
Head of household on home 
duties 
0.28* 0.27* 0.02 0.35* 0.10 
Head of household retired 0.09 -0.01 -0.14 0.28 -0.10 
Head of household illness or 
disability 
1.23*** 0.74*** 0.65*** 0.54*** 1.06*** 
Head of household not yet at 
work 
0.04 -0.11 -0.04 -0.05 -0.19 
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Ref: Head of household has 
tertiary degree 
Head of household has primary 
degree 
0.25 0.29* 0.31** 0.10 0.40* 
Head of household has 
secondary degree 
0.08 0.16 0.18 -0.03 0.28* 












Ref: Household 2 adults      
1 Adult 0.21 0.27 0.21 0.30* 0.15 
3+ Adults -0.28 -0.10 0.05 -0.09 -0.03 
1 adult with children aged under 
18 
0.10 0.31 0.38 0.12 0.28 
2 adults with 1-3 children aged 
under 18 
-0.07 0.19 0.19 0.04 0.18 
Other households with children 
aged under 18 
0.01 0.27 0.45* 0.14 0.32 
 
     
Number of children under 18 0.10 0.05 -0.00 0.06 0.08 
Number of adults 18-64 0.11 0.07 -0.02 0.13 -0.04 
Number of adults 65+ -0.16 -0.32* -0.42** -0.23 -0.48* 










Observations 12,251 12,251 12,251 12,251 12,251 
AIC 43,170 29,779 25,985 25,262 
 
25,511 
















A Fuel Allowance is a payment under the National Fuel 
Scheme to help with the cost of heating homes during 
winter. It is paid to people who are dependent on long-term 
social welfare payments and who are unable to provide for 
their own heating needs. It is a means tested payment.  
GP Visit card GP visit cards cover the costs of GP visits. People who do 
not qualify for a medical card may qualify for a GP visit card 
under the following criteria: 
People aged over 70 years of age without a means test 
people aged under 70 years of age if they meet the means 
test 
People in receipt of full or half-rate of Carer’s Benefit or 
Carer’s Allowance 







The Housing Benefits Package (HBP) helps homes with the 
cost of the TV licence and electricity or gas bills. Only one 
person in a household can get the Package. 
The Package is designed for those aged 70 or over, 
regardless of whether they receive a State pension. The 
package is not means tested. It can also be available to 
people under 70 years subject to certain conditions. 
Medical card Medical cards are designed to cover the costs of medical 
services in Ireland. The qualification for medical card is 
either based on a means test or on some automatic criteria. 
For the means test there are different rules depending of the 
age of the person distinguishing those under and over 70 
years of age. Automatic qualification applies to the following: 
People with EU (European Union) entitlement (example of 
people in receipt of social security pension from another 
country) 
Children under 18 years of age who have been diagnosed 
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with cancer within the last five years 
People affected by the drug Thalidomide 
Women who have had a symphysiotomy 
People who live in direct provision accommodation 
Children in foster care 
Women who were resident in certain institutions 
In addition can qualify also, people aged 16–25 (including 
students) whom parent or guardian has a medical card and 





Mortgage Interest Supplement (MIS) provided short-term 
support to help households pay with mortgage interest costs. 
The scheme has been closed to new entrants since January 
2014. It is designed for those who were able to cover their 
mortgage costs originally, but due to personal circumstances 
can no longer finance the payments.  
Rental 
Allowance 
Rental Allowance is payable to tenants “of certain dwellings 
affected by the decontrol of rents on 26th July 1982”. This 
scheme is designed with a unique group of tenants in mind, 




Rent Supplement is a means-tested payment for certain 
people living in private rented accommodation who cannot 
provide for the cost of their accommodation from their own 
resources. It is a short-term income support for people in the 




Telephone Support Allowance is a weekly payment for 
people who live alone and are already in receipt of certain 
other social welfare payments. It assists the cost of 
communications and or home security solutions. It is paid at 
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